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ABSTRACT

Tainted Perceptions: Liberal-Democracy and
American Popular Images of China
by
Thomas Laszlo Dorogi
Dr. Sue Fawn Chung, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor o f History
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
The primary thesis o f this study is that beginning with the pre-Tiananmen Square
incident o f 1989, American popular and institutional images o f China focused on the
reformist nature the government, but following the military crackdown in June 1989, this
optimism dwindled and resulted in the creation o f an ambivalent cross-cultural
atmosphere toward the Chinese for the next half decade. When Chinese leaders decided
to undertake military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in mid-1995, America’s perception of
the PRC swung even further in a distinctly negative direction; an event that marked the
outset o f a three year period during which Chinese military modernization and economic
expansion were viewed as a direct threat to the international political hegemony o f the
United States. Although cultural depictions o f China cast an unsavory light over
Beijing’s long-term intentions, the liberal-democratic philosophy that guided the
formulation o f these stereotypes was culturally reconfigured to meet the demands o f a

in
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global economy. Hence, America’s ideological structure acquired a dynamic o f
international applicability; a development that reaffirmed the political superiority and
validity o f liberal-democracy and the fi-ee-market system.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY, AND
THE NATURE OF IMAGES
Since global communication, direct access, and more frequent media coverage
characterize the international milieu o f cultural exchange, the importance o f accurate and
detailed information concerning developments in the People’s Republic o f China is even
more pertinent, because greater cross-cultural contact requires realistic depictions o f
foreign peoples. In the coming decades, China’s international position as an economic
powerhouse is expected to substantially increase. The recent growth o f large-scale
foreign investment in the PRC reflects this general trend toward Chinese economic
expansion. However, cross-cultural exchange and high level contact between the United
States and China remain constrained. When compared to the 9.9%^ annual growth rate
average China has enjoyed for the past seventeen years (partially due to direct foreign
investment), the expected relaxation o f Cold-War animosities have not fared as well.
American popular attitudes o f Chinese society, especially since the establishment o f the
PRC in 1949, have exhibited a distinct ambivalence about the fundamental nature o f the
Chinese communist government and its socio-political evolution. For the last decade,
unfortunately, the less than objective formulation o f cross-cultural images by the
American popular press has resulted in the dissemination o f highly negative images and
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impressionistic stereotypes about the socio-political evolution o f China. As the supposed
normalization o f Sino-American relations proceeds at an even greater rate, American
cultural assumptions about China are bound to become more culturally biases, if current
trends continue.
In China and the American Dream, sociologist Richard Madsen argued that
Americans have interpreted the evolution o f Chinese history since the Second World War
through their Liberal democratic assumptions about human socio-political development.
Madsen concluded his study after the Tiananmen Square incident o f 1989 and claimed
that this tumultuous event marked an end to the era o f American ideahsm with regard to
American expectations o f political and social liberalization in the PRC.^ In the 1990s,
this idealization that Madsen interestingly referred to has reemerged, but this time the
issues and concepts that characterized the images presented in the popular press are
emotionally more aggressive and ideologically contemptuous.
M ore often than not, these reports were based on superficial interpretations o f recent
Chinese history, a perpetuation o f myths regarding the nature o f Chinese culture, and a
tendency on the part o f journalists/columnists to predict future patterns o f social
evolution founded on impressionistic and vague images o f the Chinese past. In terms o f
their specific development, the progressive creation o f these assumptions in America took
place through the gradual internalization o f press reports, magazine articles, and
television presentations. In addition, popular American interpretations o f political and
economic events in modem China also coincide with America’s political and economic
interests. The emotional overtone of many magazine articles, in this regard, are often
highly critical o f selective aspects of the Chinese domestic environment, particularly
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when domestic circumstances that emerge in China conflict with American cultural
principles o f individual liberty, democracy, and human rights. More than simply a group
o f facts presented in a sequential manner, the treatment o f events by the mainstream
media are carefully arranged, in order to convey specific and well-defined pictures o f
modem China; in terms o f their emotive and ideological quality. Moreover, the notion o f
America as a missionary o f its cultural, economic, and political standards (otherwise
known as the “white man’s burden”) with universal applicability, still pervades the
American media’s coverage o f the PRC. Thus, the actual process o f image formulation is
an exercise in altering and redefining our deeply held beliefs/values regarding China;
values that are, in part, determined by ongoing changes in the sphere o f intemational
economics and domestic socio-political ideals. As this procedure in image manufacturing
functions in the realm o f popular culture, throughout time, these images ultimately result
in the creation o f a fictional history o f Chinese society, that serves to reinforce the overall
misperceptions o f the modem Chinese historical experience.
While American foreign policy interests underwent severe redefinitions after the
June 1989 Tiananmen incident, they have also maintained tremendous continuity
regarding the issue o f commerce and investment in China. In the past decade — which is
roughly the scope o f this project — the core o f America’s China policy has centered on
the fundamental financial benefits that Sino-American commercial contact has offered
American businesses. Beginning in the late 1970s as Cold War tensions between
Washington and Beijing were significantly thawing, America looked to a policy o f
increased contact based on trade negotiations. Although the democratic aspirations o f
America were definitely part o f Washington’s China policy package, human rights, non
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proliferation, and the issue o f Taiwan were secondary concerns when compared with the
prospective monetary gains offered by heightened commercial contact with Beijing. For
the most part, the ideological rhetoric and the images o f China reinforced this notion o f
positive trade relations and the idea that economic liberalization in China would
eventually lead to political reform.
In 1989, however, this foreign policy toward China underwent a radical réévaluation.
The sanguine vision o f a democratic utopia for future China came tumbling down and
was replaced by a more critical assessment o f the PRC as an emerging economic power
operating under an authoritarian political system. Following the crisis and bloodshed in
Tiananmen Square on June 4 and 5, American policy makers quickly revised their
strategy for dealing with the Chinese government and brought to the forefront o f the
China debate the importance of, at least in strictly a rhetorical fashion, democracy,
Taiwan, and human rights, to mention but a few. As the post-Cold War era began to
unfold, the various presidential administrations addressed these concerns in different
ways, while hoping that the slow diffusion o f capitalism in China would ultimately lead
to the infusion o f liberal-democratic ideals within the populace.
Similarly, the plethora o f images constructed by the American press throughout this
period was founded on an ideological footing not unlike that o f America’s policy
administrators. Since the Liberal-democratic social philosophy is present within the
institutions o f both the American political machine and the corporate media, their
ideological reactions to the situations in China were in many ways identical. Essentially,
as the objective concentrations o f governmental policy shifted throughout time, the
images that stemmed from the mass media, especially popular news magazines, largely
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coincided with these sudden shifts. Accordingly, these images reinforce dramatic and
subtle modifications in American foreign policy, because both o f these cultural
institutions, tor the most part, share the socio-philosophical viewpoint that liberal
democracy, representative government, freedom o f speech, free trade, and the importance
o f personal expression are universal human rights, are not simply social ideals bound
within the borders o f the United States.

Methodology
When analyzing the history o f cross-cultural stereotypes and images at the national
level, the makeup o f a given culture must be taken into consideration. The individual, in
terms o f his/her personal contribution to the culture at large, is the foundational element
within any society. In recent years, increased attention in the academic community has
been given to the theory o f cultural deconstructionism. The deconstructionist school o f
thought has spawned a new scholarly emphasis on the examination o f societies and
various cultures from a particularistic perspective, especially within the sub-discipline o f
cultural studies and multicultural analysis; therefore, an added significance has been
placed on the micro-elemental differences among peoples, rather than a focus upon the
similarities that bind humans culturally.
Already by the late 1970s, acclaimed labor historian Herbert Gutman criticized a
growing trend in labor studies toward this end. With regard to this methodological drift,
Gutman concluded that overspecialization £ind particularization in historical studies,
without a firm foundation or reference to the greater societal forces at work (macro
history), often led to a narrow and over-specialized method o f evaluation. More
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importantly, this approach ran the risk o f not contributing to situational patterns that form
the historical experience o f a society at the national level. Gutman further argued that
“[sjomething is learned from such specialized studies, but in themselves such works often
substitute classification for meaning and wash out the wholeness that is essential to
understanding human behavior.”^ Even though Gutman was referring to the over
specialization that enveloped American social history, his insights into the difficulties
that can arise from such a methodology are applicable to the emergence o f cultural
history in the contemporary era and the strain o f particularization that currently
dominates this academic field. An over-concentration on the fine points and intricate
specifics o f societies and cultures, therefore, can lead to a methodological evasion o f the
macro-picture and the greater commonalities that bind societies under similar sociophilosophical ideals and values.
Today cultural historians are divided between two dominant interpretive strategies.
The more traditional methodological approach applied by cultural historians is founded
on the interpretive systems o f anthropologist Clifford Geertz. With a contextual focus on
what French historian Robert Damton described as “history in the ethnographic grain,”
Geertzian cultural analysis seeks to decipher the “meaning inscribed by contemporaries,”
within a specific socio-historical environment.'* Moreover, this mode o f examination
deciphers the simple parochialism o f traditional (cause and effect) history in greater
cultural detail, and unearths the symbolic meanings that shared ideas and values can
create. For the study o f image formulation and how a cultural institution — in this case
the m edia— transmits its interpretations to the culture at large, the Geertzian system o f
cultural analysis, with its attention on meaning, is highly useful.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Without unnecessarily lauding the academic achievements o f Geertz, certain
problems are endemic to any perspective that seeks to draw an umbrella o f meaning over
an entire society. Roger Chartier, well known critic and opponent o f the Geertzian
perspective, argues that searching for “symbolic forms” in a cultural milieu tends to
downplay the human conflicts and strife that underlie the experiences o f humans in all
societies. In other words, when a researcher places added weight on the importance o f
shared assumptions (and their meaning), deeply rooted problems and differences are
glossed over that foster intra-social alienation.^ Therefore, it is absolutely crucial to
realize that actual ethnic, religious, and value bound differences shape the complexity o f
events that generate social politics at the internal level, but intra-cultural similarities and
shared systems o f value nevertheless bind the national tapestry o f culture in most post
modern societies, including the United States.
When examining the historical evolution o f popular images, a conceptual paradigm
through which the culture o f mass media can be examined is absolutely necessary. Jim
McGuigan argues that in relation to popular culture, “the intellectual assumptions, made
by some students o f popular culture, that symbolic experiences and practices o f ordinary
people are more important analytically and politically than Culture with a capital C” is
valid.*^ As a complementary note to the above statement, Stuart Hall suggests that the
environment where the interaction o f these ideas occurs is actually a forum in which
“collective social understandings are created.”^ When taken as a compilation o f shared
ideas with common themes that underscore their emotive and intellectual qualities, crosscultural stereotypes, over time, are shaped into important assumptions that assist in the
perpetuation o f the “politics o f significance.”® For the vast majority o f Americans who
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are exposed solely to the influence o f the mass m edia as a source o f data on
developments in China (as opposed to the more objective literature available in academic
journals), an entire worldview about a given topic might rest completely on images found
in the realm o f mass-media culture— with a lowercase “c.”
In every society, the complex o f impressions produced by image formulators, in the
words o f philosopher Michel Foucault, are linked ideologically and politically to that
particular nation’s “regime o f truth” and its political culture.^ Societies operate in
accepted modes o f discourse, where incoming information and situations, for example the
interpretations o f politics in foreign governments, are filtered through a culturally
accepted set o f values that reinforce proper behavior and concepts o f truth.
Notwithstanding Foucault’s philosophical inclination toward cultural relativism, the
notion o f a “regime o f truth” sheds much needed Light on the nature o f culturally bound
values and ideals, without resorting to the extremities o f absolute relativism. Therefore,
through a combined use o f Geertzian cultural theory and Foucault’s argument regarding
the relationship between power and established cultural norms, an inquiry into the recent
history o f American images of China can yield a more holistic understanding o f their
nature and function, with respect to the socio-political philosophy that binds America’s
national psyche.
With regard to the above material, three periodicals that form the core o f American
popular (media) culture will be examined in this study. Since Time. U.S. News & World
Report, and Newsweek all review issues, events, and matters o f public concern on a
weekly basis and form the core o f popular press reports on many intemational
developments, these three periodicals will serve as the methodological basis from which
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popular images will be systematically extracted. Moreover, these magazines comprise a
genre o f popular literature that is distinct from the more insightful and critically written
daily publications; hence, they deserve separate analytical treatment from other forms o f
popular literature such as the New York Times and Los Angeles Times. The politics and
issues covered by these three magazines, in general, tend to be rather similar, and the
emotive tone and ideological slant (not political) found within these text are also common
to all three. Rigorous inquiry into the articles and editorials that focus on aspects of
China and will be augmented by government documents such as the presidential papers.
State Department documents, bulletins, and briefings. These documents will be
examined as the primary source material for the foreign policy aspect o f the project. In
addition, secondary literature also will be brought in to reinforce and elucidate the
significance and meaning o f primary documents. In each chapter, a chronological and
topical format separates policy initiatives and related images into distinct periods,
beginning with the intemational political crisis sparked by the 1989 military crackdown
o f student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square. In summary, the pattern o f development
in diplomatic, political, and ideological motivations that guided American political
assessments o f ongoing changes in China hopefully will substantiate the thesis that
cultural and ideological motivations were at work in foreign policy and image
construction. More importantly, their common liberal-democratic philosophical root has
caused a misrepresentation o f developments in Chinese society, since China is seemingly
headed in a politically/economically divergent direction when compared to western
democracies such as the United States.
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The Psychology o f Image Creation
Before examining the nature o f American popular perceptions o f China, a brief
examination o f images and their construction is appropriate. Historian Stuart Creighton
Miller conducted one o f the first major analyses o f nineteenth-century American cultural
attitudes and their connection to xenophobia in his book The Unwelcome Immigrant. In
terms o f its contemporary appUcability, Miller’s methodological perspective offers a
clear picture into the process o f image construction and its psychological tendency for
self-perpetuation. In quoting Walter Lippman, Miller suggests:
Obviously, the interaction o f these events on an older image is cmcial. The human
mind does not see an object or situation and then define what it has observed.
Rather, it brings to any situation or object a definition and then sees what it has
already defined. “In ... the confusion o f the outer world,” Walter Lippman
states, “we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to
perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our
culture.” There is, o f course, great economy in such a process. We are bombarded
with far too many stimuli to see everything fireshly and in great detail, but must
perceive in categories, types, generalities, or stereotypes. Indeed, such attitudes,
categories, and stereotypes make up a cognitive map in the human mind which is a
powerful determinant o f public opinion. Essentially, this more stable, less conscious,
less rational, and more generalized substrata of public opinion is what the historian
firequently calls a “climate o f opinion” or “image.”
In light o f the above statement, image construction and subsequent climates o f opinion,
therefore, manifest in the empirical world as a plethora o f impressions that combine to
form a set generalization. Geertz described these generalizations as “webs o f
significance”" that compose important elements within the overall mosaic o f meaning in
a given culture. Meaning, in this sense, can refer to the basic source o f these generalities,
since human reaction (mental reaction based on culturally laden ideas) generates fi'om
fundamental opinions and beliefs about moral, proper, and correct behavior. Thus,
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human beings are not clean slates through which external stimuli (empirical processes)
pass in a purely objective fashion.
By examining the climate o f opinion and the multitude o f images that contribute to
its development, we attain additional knowledge regarding the core beliefs o f a society by
viewing the nature o f image dissemination. In an article from Anthropology Todav.
anthropologist Terence Turner argued that in order to accurately acquire knowledge
about a particular culture, rather than entering a field study with preconceived ideas and
hypothesis that might compromise the viewer’s level o f objectivity, researchers should
allow the experimental group to pose questions and discuss matters o f significance that
are essential to their day-to-day lives. This method, by limiting the amount o f outside
interference from the researcher— especially when dealing with the production o f
cultural opinions and images — magnifies the aspects o f life that are culturally and
ideologically relevant to the group. For example, in relation to images and their
importance, by scanning the coverage o f another culture in American popular literature,
the analyst may ascertain those components o f Chinese society that are culturally
acceptable or deplorable to Americans.
In some cases, however, problems can arise from a methodological standpoint that
overemphasize the meaning found within bulky generalizations. In the Chan’s Great
Continent. Chinese historian Jonathan Spence notes that “[i]t is my implicit belief that
bold generahzations are usually wide o f the mark, and that the individual experience
rarely matches the allegedly universal trend.”" With respect to the infinite amount o f
variation that characterizes the individual experiences o f people, Spence is ultimately
correct. But at the national or cultural level, there are more to images and stereotypes
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than unique individual specifics. Strong continuities unite these personal, or in our case
journalistic, impressions, that otherwise might not bear any resemblance to one another.
The patterns visible in the specific articles that form the basis o f this project, in
sociologist Max W eber’s words, can construct “a complex o f elements associated with
historical reality which we unite into a conceptual whole from the standpoint o f their
cultural significance.” The climate o f opinion, when viewing it from the Weberian
standpoint, “must be gradually put together out o f the individual parts which are taken
from historical reality to make it up.” "
In sum, the forthcoming study brings together the most useful aspects o f the above
methodological systems, to illuminate the understudied link that exists between American
socio-political values, foreign policy objectives in China, and media images that
ultimately reinforce policy initiatives at different points in time.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER!

LIBERAL-DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN
SOCIO-PHILOSOPHICAL IDEALS
A brief treatment and explanation o f ideology in American society is necessary since
the controversy in academia over this issue is still unresolved. Traditionally and
contemporarily, Americans have not thought o f themselves as a nation with strong
ideological underpinnings. Soviet communism and German fascism, more often than not,
are the two pohtical systems that Americans normally point to, when asked to identify
pohtical philosophies steeped in strong “ideology.” In fact, sociologist Richard Madsen
maintains that “[mjost Americans think o f themselves as having no ideology— only the
freedom to believe whatever they wish.”* Historically, this attitude toward freedom o f
thought and action has sustained the notion that the United States is, and has always been,
an ideologically neutral land where freedom o f expression is paramount, and the
repressive dogmatism o f communism and fascism are nonexistent. “Most Americans
would probably agree with this sentiment,” adds Madsen, and ‘Svould regard the
openness o f mind, the absence o f dogmatism, the tolerance o f diverse opinions as selfevidently good.’" These individuals would also probably argue that America’s
concentration on personal freedoms is precisely the factor that protects citizens from the
tyranny o f a state-induced ideology.

13
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When applying the term ideology to the socio-political culture and philosophy o f the
United States, one must begin to look beyond the historically narrow use o f this term.
First, American socio-political values contain a definite element o f rationalism. Mike
Cormack claims that “beliefs which are held consciously” and composed o f the principles
o f rational thought, can also be viewed as forms o f ideology.^ Moreover, ideology should
not be seen as an “aberration” in the historical development o f a nation, but rather as a
fimctional tool that reinforces the cultural or socio-political condition o f a society.'* As
Graeme Turner has persuasively argued in British Cultural Studies, individuals are
usually unaware o f their socio-ideological dispositions that become internalized in the
human psyche over time, because its application to external stimuli is primarily an
“unconscious”^ process o f reactions to practices and habits. Therefore, when observed as
the manifestation o f ideas that maintain a system o f order for an entire nation, ideology is
nothing more than a value structure that perpetuates the life-ways o f a people; when its
values are confironted with contradictory systems o f thought fi*om an internal or external
source.
Contemporarily speaking, American society, in terms o f its racial, ethnic, and
religious composition, is increasingly becoming more and more diverse. The pluralistic
makeup o f America naturally creates a roadblock for the cultural historian who seeks to
understand nations in homogeneous terms, hence any suggestion in that regard would
prove methodologically fatal for a researcher. Inasmuch as America is not a culturally
homogeneous political entity, alternative perspectives are required to make sense o f the
modem American cultural condition. With this in mind, Madsen suggests that
underneath the many ethnic dissimilarities and sub-cultures that divide the nation, the
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majority o f people who reside in America subscribe to a set o f basic assumptions — that
Americans understand as universal truths. For example, John Hall observes that most
industrial societies “are based upon historically high levels o f geographic and social
mobility, and these increase the ‘life chances’ o f individuals.”^ Hall’s statement makes
complete sense when viewed in terms o f a socio-philosophical ethic, an ethic that Madsen
argues forms the core of the nation’s social philosophy.^ Surpassing all other common
notions o f the human experience, Americans adhere to the ideal that freedom, democracy
and the “good life,”®are accepted truths by all cultures throughout the world since they
are founded on the axiom o f human reason. Furthermore, the conceptual arena where
these ideas are combined by a common thread is the realm o f reason and science.
Madsen essentially concludes:
Among liberalism’s main assumptions is the notion that what is most distinctively
human is the capacity for instrumental reason, which finds its fulfillment in modem
science and technology. Another assumption is that the application o f such
rationality will lead to constant and universal progress in which the increasing
economic abundance produced by a society o f diverse and independent individuals is
complemented by forms o f governance that respect the autonomy and privacy o f all
people. A final key assumption is that individual autonomy and freedom from all
external constraints is an ultimate, universal value. Americans are used to seeing
these liberal assumptions as not culturally determined or socially constructed but as
self-evident, universally applicable truths about the world.^
The ideological footing, therefore, that runs through the American psyche is the
assumption that our cherished belief in liberal-democracy is not a cultural construct with
limited apphcabihty inside the boarders o f the United States. Rather, American socio
political ideals, by the very nature o f their supposed universality, seek to convert foreign
peoples with opposing belief systems concerning proper government, ethics, and
economics.
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Another American conviction stems from the fundamental principles o f philosopher
John Locke and his notion o f government based on human contract. Founded on the
concept that governmental power should reside in a body o f citizens, American political
thought and social philosophy adheres to the standard that civil and political rights can be
secured only through a republican form o f government. “Many other interdependent
principles and values embellish the liberal tradition,” explains Jie Chen, such as “limited
government, individual liberty, due process o f law, self-determination, capitalism, free
enterprise, [and] inalienable (natural) rights.”

With regard to image formulation, this

traditional outlook has had a tremendously negative impact on the manner in which
Americans view China. Since this liberal-democratic tradition is in direct conflict with
the more authoritarian thought patterns o f the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the
PRC, America’s China policy has suffered from a socio-philosophical incompatibility
with the current regime in Beijing. Throughout this study, articles from the mainstream
press will serve to substantiate the argument that this heritage o f liberalism runs through
the media’s depiction o f occurrences in China, in addition to the claim that liberalism
forms the primary motivation (economic and political) for US policy toward China.
Many scholars, including policy critic Noam Chomsky, have commented upon the
role o f the media in portraying specific cultural images. Arguing from an extremely
critical standpoint, Chomsky suggests that the modern-day media, as an institution that
belongs to the network o f corporate enterprises in the American economy, is directly tied
to ideological presuppositions that permeate the “control pyramids” o f the economic
system.* * In his view, the institution o f the corporate media is not an independent entity
that is politically and culturally unrelated to the greater ideological powers at work in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17

modem America. Instead, because the media adhere to the principles o f freedom and
liberal-democratic thought in much the same way as the majority o f the populace, they
have similar interests in maintaining America’s socio-political system as it operates
today. Chomsky argues that “[a]s state capitalism developed into the modem era,
economic, political, and ideological systems have increasingly been taken over by vast
institutions o f private tyranny that are about as close to the totalitarian ideal as any that
humans have so far constmcted.” *^ Notwithstanding the harsh cynicism o f Chomsky, he
addressed an important point in terms o f the nature o f economics and the corporate
superstmcture that supports this base o f power. Elsewhere, Chomsky suggests that at an
extreme level, especially in “free” ’®societies, pub he opinion is cmcial to the survival of
the pohtical regime in power. In this case, power may simply refer to the sociophilosophical values o f business and public interests (democracy and freedom), so the
function o f the media, as an institution with similar ideological convictions toward these
ends, assists the power-base o f interests in furthering the web o f value-bound propaganda
that legitimates the vahdity o f the American way o f life.
M any scholars, however, altogether reject the proposition that a hegemonic stmcture
o f ideas encompasses the national psyche. Sociologist Mark Gottdiener counters the
above argument by attacking its innate simphcity. Mass culture, according to Gottdiener,
“imphes that stmctural or institutional practices are automatically transformed into deeplevel psychological ones through the agency of media control." Because o f its
reductionism into a purely economic and profit-seeking thesis, critics maintain that
hegemony theory and Chomsky’s criticism of neo-liberalism neglects to take into
consideration the dissenting individuals in society who do not adhere to the precepts of
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liberal-democracy. This counter argument, in opposition to the hegemonist camp,
nevertheless has to recognize that an overwhelming system o f power— liberalism —
dictates the actions and mindset o f individuals that comprise the body o f journalists who
staff the American press. Even though a minority o f non-adherents reject the
fimdamental ideals o f hberalism, the traditional concept o f politics in contemporary
American society is based upon a history o f liberal-democratic thought; a history o f
thought that forms one component within the program o f socialization and assimilation.
Other aspects o f the media culture also contribute to the manner in which stories and
international events are interpreted by the joum ahstic community. The media’s
“emphasis on drama thus leads to journalists’ preference for news about current
happenings.” '^ Stories are chosen for publication in many instances simply because they
contain sensationalistic and dramatic elements. Done to grab the attention of the reader,
this mode o f joum ahsm tends to dilute any objectivity that may be contained in the
report. More importantly, because most journalists covering happenings that take place
in foreign countries are not extensively trained in anthropology, history, political science,
or cross-cultural studies, interpretations are simphfied and the content o f the stories often
lack the level o f complexity that is necessary to properly covey the event. The proper
political and cultural context is sacrificed in many instances, either because the story is
visually or emotionally dramatic, or because the journalist lacks the background
knowledge in cultural studies required for accurate reporting. In addition, distant
countries are sometimes dealt with in a haphazard or elementary methodological fashion
(covered only in times o f crisis), so more intriguing stories usually outweigh less
dramatic day-to-day events.'^ “Violence and disaster” fill the pages o f the mainstream
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press, and as a result, an impression can arise in the mind o f the reader that the level o f
socio-poUtical turm oil in foreign lands is m ore common than in actuality.'^ Therefore, an
“exaggerated” emiphasis on news items w ith a component o f sensationahsm dominates
the media in the U nited States, and its interpretation o f the poUtical climate abroad,
especially in Chima.'^ These problems in foreign news reporting are most visible in the
case o f America’s popular reaction to the poUtical strife that enveloped China in May and
June o f 1989. Beginning with the events that led to the ultimate military crackdown by
Beijing authorities in the first week o f June, the foreign poUcy position o f the United
States will be anal^rzed in the following chapter, with the concomitant depiction o f the
crisis in the American press.
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CHAPTERS

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND POPULAR
IMAGES: THE CASE OF TIANANMEN
SQUARE
American foreign policy during the Cold War toward the Communist block was
based on the notion o f strategic containment. When communist forces led by Mao
Zedong seized territorial control o f mainland China in 1949, American policy makers
were confronted with an additional communist giant in East Asia. At this time, growing
poUtical pressure in the United States, fostered by a domestic need to explain the poUtical
\actory o f the Chinese Communist Party, eventually led to a poUtical witch-hunt within
the upper echelons o f the State Department. Beginning with the administration o f Harry
Truman, America sought, at all cost, to contain the growing influence of Soviet
communism throughout the globe, but particularly in the third world. PoUtical
opportunists, especially Senator Joseph McCarthy, accused the Far Eastern Division o f
the State Department for the “loss o f China.” ' Anti- c o m m u nism was not confined to a
few shrewd politicians, however. For the next twenty years, American poUtical attitudes
and poUcy toward Communist China was founded on the premise that containment was
imperative to halt the advance o f Maoist communism. In this era, Washington
inaccurately viewed the poUtical motivations o f Moscow and Beijing as virtually
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synonymous, hence an image developed where the Chinese and Soviet forms o f
communism were viewed as basically the same in terms o f international recognition. The
United States also refused to recognize the Communist regime in Beijing as the
legitimate government o f China. Until the administration o f President Richard Nixon and
his subsequent visit to China in 1972, low and high-level contact between the two powers
was nonexistent. To remedy the basic antagonism that pitted the two nations against one
another poUtically and militarily, Nixon sought to renew dialogue at the diplomatic level
with Communist China, while laying the groundwork for future economic and cultural
interchange. Hence, beginning in 1972, a fragile but optimistic relationship was
constructed that would last until the outbreak o f violence in Tiananmen Square during the
summer o f 1989. W hat exactly were the motivating forces that encouraged
administrators in Washington to reestablish contact with the People’s Republic?
The strategic containment o f Soviet influence in Asia and the political split between
the Chinese and Russians in the mid 1950s motivated America to renew diplomatic
exchanges with Beijing in the following decade. More importantly, Robert S. Ross
argues that a “shared perception” by both nations that a decrease in the political influence
o f the Soviet Union was necessary for geopolitical balance, prompted dialogue between
the two countries.^ Nixon saw a political benefit in seeking strategic relations with
Communist China, and many Americans were delighted at the prospect that renewed
relations could possibly increase commercial contacts in East Asia. For more than twenty
years, American commercial dealings in China were nonexistent. But with Nixon’s visit
and subsequent political events such as the death o f Chairman Mao Zedong and the
ascent of the more economically pragmatic leader Deng Xiaoping, commercial exchange.
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mostly in the form o f small consumer goods and textile exports, began to rapidly
increase. By the early 1980s, the nineteenth-century vision o f a vast China market had
reemerged.
Contrary to the Uberal opinion that there are more pertinent aspects to American
foreign pohcy toward China than mere trade concerns, historian Jacques M. Downs
maintains that the basis for American diplomatic contact with China in the previous
century rested on the economic need for market expansion. “In fact,” Downs argues,
“down to the first World War, the United States’ primary interest in relations with most
other countries was commerce.”^ During the Cold War, the prospective market that
China had offered in the past was temporarily placed on hold, for the immediate need to
contain communism in Asia overshadowed commercial diplomacy. But as the fear o f
Soviet communism gradually waned and the financial influence o f all other industrial
nations was eclipsed by the United Sates as the most technologically and economically
advanced nation in the world, trade concerns once again emerged as a primary motivation
to reestabhsh contact with the PRC.
The United States was not the only beneficiary in this new strategic partnership.
Although economic and ideological inspirations formed the core o f America’s future
dealings in the Far East, the advantages for China were many. As Brookings Institute
Fellow Harry Harding explains, the long-term benefits provided the Chinese with a vast
market for exports, while at the same time scientific techniques were acquired from the
United States to modernize the domestic economy.
Both Chinese and Americans pointed to mutual economic interests as an alternative
basis for their bilateral relationship. Natural complementarity existed, it was said,
between the world’s largest developed country and the world’s largest developing
nation. Americans wanted more foreign markets for their exports, more sites for
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overseas investment, and more inexpensive consumer goods, and they could find all
o f those things in China. China wanted access to the vast American market,
advanced American technology, and American financial and investment capital.
That, along with the two societies’ common desire for expanded cultural, scientific,
and academic exchange, might sustain Sino-American relations even without a
Soviet threat.'*
Since the ideological motivations o f America were founded on the principles o f
individual fi-eedom, representative government, and a belief that capitahsm was superior
to the cultural and economic stagnancy o f communism, the underlying thrust o f U.S.
pohcy abroad sought the prohferation o f these ideals. Janet W olff aptly describes the
connection between a people’s ideology and a nation’s mode o f production when stating,
“the theory o f ideology states that the ideas and beliefs people have are related to their
actual and material conditions o f existence.”^ As renewed exchanges (cultural and
financial) with the PRC gave hope to many Americans for future political liberalization
on the part o f communist leaders, policy makers were concerned mostly with the
commercial benefits that growing trade with China could bring to American businesses.
The “myth o f the China market” was advertised by the press and many analysts
envisioned the Chinese masses as potential consumers “o f a vast emerging market.”^
Most importantly, many Americans deeply believed that once China opened its doors to
the United States and Uberal thinking, the system o f Maoism and central economic
planning would slowly wither away. Instead o f sociaUsm, Americans wished to see
China as a “land o f liberty, pluralism, private ownership, and free markets.” '^ An
optimism of gradual modification, therefore, fostered an image o f China as a country that
would, in time, incorporate these values into its socio-political structure.
American apprehensions about human rights were definitely a component o f
Washington’s official pohcy as late as 1987, but the supposed cultural revolution that
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economic liberalization would bring to China was believed to be the force or reform with
the most potential. Hence, human rights and other moral anxieties that Washington may
have had with regard to the Chinese government were not readily addressed. As we shall
see later, the manner in which the mainstream press reacted to the Tiananmen incident
reinforced the pohcy shift that President George Bush undertook after peaceful hopes for
democratization and economic liberalization were temporarily shattered.
A brief summary o f American foreign pohcy in the years prior to 1989 is crucial in
order substantiate the claim that market access was America’s paramount concern in the
late 1980s. In the eyes o f Washington pohcy formulators, the reciprocal tradeoffs that
commercial interaction presented helped cement a pohcy o f high-level engagement under
the assumption that liberalization in China would gradually follow. Succinctly, this was
the core o f America’s China pohcy in 1987. Cultural problems and ethnic selfdetermination, well before their popularization in the 1990s, were issues o f importance
during the second Reagan adrnmistration. The tone o f pohcy makers was sanguine,
however, so human rights, non-proliferation, and the Sino-Taiwanese issue o f
reunification shaped pohcy only in a marginal manner.

American Foreign Policv and China: Interests
Prior to Tiananmen Square
The nucleus o f Ronald Reagan’s China pohcy in 1987 was shaped by prospects for
future trade. In March o f that year. Secretary o f State George Shultz expressed this
optimism at the Dahan Management Training Center in China. In this speech, he
outlined current and forthcoming opportunities that could substantially enhance the
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bilateral relationship between the two nations. The fundamental theme that underscored
the entire presentation was the need to increase Chinese-American prosperity in the
coming years. “As the leaders o f China and the United States confront the problems of
how to ensure greater security and prosperity for their peoples,” Shultz declared, “we
both face important economic decision.”^ He continued by stating that increased
technological trade was imperative for both the future success o f China and the United
States, in terms o f technological advancement:
For China, for the United States... this new information age will require, above all
else, that we continue to open our doors to one another. When such doors are open
— when people, goods, and ideas can flow freely between u s— both Chinese and
Americans can learn from each other.... But much more can and should be done.
The People’s Republic and the United States have only begun to tap our rich
potential for mutually beneficial trade. An expanded exchange in goods, services,
technologies, and investments will be important both to your country’s
modernization effort and to my country’s economic well being.^
Notwithstanding the positive tone o f the above statement, Shultz argued that for a healthy
economy with a solid foundation in law to emerge, China must take steps to enact
legislation “toward protecting intellectual property.”

In this sense, the question o f basic

commercial exchange was considered by Shultz to be a given, but America was
apprehensive about trading extensively in an economic miheu with m in im al regard for
the rule o f law.
The trade question reappeared once again when Chinese Foreign Minister Xueqian
Wu visited the United States in 1988. This time, the focus was centered on the viewpoint
o f the Chinese government, regarding the issue of Sino-American trade. In a similar tone
o f optimism as Shultz, a spokesperson suggested that Wu concentrated on an “expanding
relationship” with foreign nations. “The Foreign Minister emphasized China’s continued
openness to foreign investment, particularly in the coastal regions.” " Additional mention
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was given to commerce by Under Secretary o f State Michael H. Armacost in 1988, when
he said that in the foreseeable future he was confident that market exchange with China
would continue to grow, given the Chinese “priority [for] market development and
reform.” '^ As far as any strategic threats that might exist that may hamper this
bourgeoning relationship, Armacost argued that Beijing reahzed that the United States
welcomed China “as a major player on the world scene.”'^
America also realized by the end o f the decade that China had made considerable
strides in modernization since Deng Xiaoping rose to power. American policy makers,
historically, viewed Deng as the original architect o f this growing partnership, an
assessment echoed by Secretary Shultz in December o f 1988:
The groundbreaking Shanghai communiqué o f 1972 anticipated a time o f “important
changes and great upheavals” in global affairs. We have now witnessed more than
16 years o f profound changes in the international environment. The process o f
normalizing Sino-American relations helped to launch a worldwide trend o f greater
rehance on political means to resolve serious international differences... The reforms
in China embarked upon 10 years ago under Deng Xiaoping’s farsighted leadership
have fostered a decade o f impressive domestic growth and a remarkable expansion
o f U.S-China trade. Thus, in the economic sphere as well, China has been a
pacesetter.''*
As 1988 drew to a close, the pace of normalization and further commercial exchange that
began more than a decade prior appeared bright for the future. Shultz summed up
America’s sense o f where the world economy was moving by concluding that “on the
trade front, China and the United States must strive to keep the international trading
system as open as possible, in order to ensure our growth and competitiveness in the
years ahead.” '^ More than any other topic o f concern, the evolution o f the Chinese
domestic economy in a market oriented direction excited American business leaders and
pohcy makers. By 1989, as noted by Kenneth Lieberthal, the bilateral trade deficit
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between the United States and China “mushroomed during these years” to $6,235
billion.'® I f no other tangible benefits could be seen on other fironts such as human rights,
America was nonetheless pleased at the bilateral system o f trade that had developed.
Even in the coming decade, the omnipresent position o f commercial interests in
America’s China pohcy would maintain its importance as a key concern. This raises
some unnerving question about the pohtics and the power of American businesses. If
finance and business held so much weight in the overall program, what happened to
America’s principal behefs in human rights, democracy, and self-determination within
the scheme o f this policy?
When engaging in this type o f exercise, a researcher always runs the risk o f falling
into the trap o f economic (Marxist) reductionism. To answer the above question, the
American stance on the human rights issue was certainly present in the comprehensive
pohcy. Differences on human rights surfaced at many junctures in both the Reagan and
Bush administrations, but more that anything, it seems clear that human rights added an
element o f moral justification (rationalization) to the fact that America’s burgeoning
trade relationship had become extensive with the PRC. As a means to divert public
attention away fi'om the monetary contact with China, the need for greater political
fi-eedom in China was constantly used by America, if for no other reason than to pay hp
service to American ideals in human liberty. Also, as mentioned before, there was an
imphcit behef in the transformative power o f capitalism, hence the issue o f human rights
was not incredibly crucial in the short term. As Richard Madsen has noted, the course o f
socio-economic development in China was misperceived by most Americans and the
government. A cause and effect relationship was thought to naturally exist between
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greater economic liberty and political reform. Hence, the developmental paradigm o f
world-wide modernization as a set methodical and linier process was applied to the
Chinese situation. No deliberate effort was made to place human rights on top o f the
agenda, for economic freedom was sequentially equated with political reform and a
decrease in authoritarianism.
Probably the most obvious and definitive example o f this is the publication o f a 1989
State Department document that lists major and minor human rights violators throughout
the world. Out o f the nineteen federations and nations registered on the document
(presented by U.S. Representative to the United Nations Vernon A. Walter), strikingly
enough, China was absent from the list. The majority o f nations mentioned in the
document were in some manner affiliated with the Soviet Union, or were pohtically
uncooperative to the United States and other democratic governments.

Since the

Chinese government was left unscathed by this bulletin, it is arguable that before the
Tiananmen incident, U.S. administrators were more willing to ignore the less reputable
actions that China had taken against ethnic minorities and political dissenters in previous
years.
During this period, it would be incorrect to suggest that U.S. human rights issues
were altogether cast aside by pohcy makers. Even though the policy stance o f America,
in conjunction with these problems, was quite mild, America was not unaware o f the
long-term hurdle that Chinese authoritarianism presented to political reform. In 1987,
Deputy Assistant Secretary o f State Stapleton J. Roy declared that “the stress on social
discipline in both communism and Chinese tradition will place limitations on how far
liberalization may go.” '^ Secretary Roy added that progressive gains in other areas.
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namely trade, were moving on the right path; a development he hoped would bring about
“positive effect[s]” in other aspects o f Chinese society.'^ In another statement, Roy
addressed the issue o f Chinese military suppression o f protesters in the remote province
o f Tibet. The testimony focused heavily on the abuses o f power by the C o m m u n ists in
the Tibetan province, but Secretary Roy commented that China, with its long and
tumultuous history, was partially justified in its current actions;
Many circumstances led up to the recent developments in Tibet.... The story o f
depredations and massive violations o f basic human rights perpetrated ag ain st the
Tibetan people... has been exhaustively reported and documented.... China’s leaders
are determined to maintain domestic stability. Their aversion to demonstrations and
unguided mass expressions o f popular sentiment, and to pubUc comments on such
matters firom abroad by bodies like the Congress and the administration, are
characteristics o f ruling Communist parties. To effect changes in China’s attitudes
toward human rights, we need to stand firm by our principles while recognizing that
as China has moved into closer relations with countries like our own, as it has
opened its doors to the outside world, it has given greater attention to human rights
concerns.^®
Therefore, the awareness o f problems on the human rights front stemmed from the
cultural tradition o f the United States against forms o f government censorship and
political oppression. The philosophical nature o f unalienable human rights gave rise in
America to a presumption that America’s notion o f political freedoms were not mere
cultural constructs, but complete, universal tmths in themselves. Even with this emotive
baggage stamped on China policy, an overwhelming optimism (regarding trade and
future hberalization) drove policy makers to lessen the political rhetoric against
authoritarianism in China. Not until after the Tianamnen incident would the rhetoric
become more inflamed. In the wake o f these heated developments, the American popular
press would methodically reinforce America’s ideological predisposition toward liberaldemocracy.
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Lastly, the two topics o f interest that would take center stage in the pohcy debate a
decade later were only secondary concerns for the United States at this time. After the
victory o f the Communist forces on the mainland in 1949, the Chinese Nationahsts led by
Generahssimo Jiang Jishi were forced to flee to the island o f Taiwan (then called
Formosa). Notwithstanding the inter-strait mihtary disputes that separated the mainland
and Taiwan, there existed an inclination on the part o f many Chinese to reunify the two
opposing sides. However, actual poUtical dialogue was minimal and the necessary steps
for reunification were even slower to develop. With respect to this political debacle.
President Reagan took the position that “[the United States] welcome[s] the interchanges
that have taken place between China and Taiwan over the past year. We hope that
progress will continue in a climate o f relaxed tensions. We will continue to seek to foster
such a climate.”^’ As a marginal item that was not at the forefiront o f policy initiatives in
the late 1980s, the Taiwan question was ecUpsed by a greater problem that involved
weapons sales and non-proliferation:
Unresolved disputes on the Korean Peninsula, in Indochina, and in the Middle East
require our consultation and cooperation to promote the poUtical resolution o f
dangerous threats to stability.... China and the United States, joining together with
all nations, must address the challenge posed by the proliferation o f advanced
weapomy — especially chemical and biological agents and high-tech deUvery
systems. ^
Therefore, in the years before the Tiananmen Square crisis, these issues — Taiwan,
human rights, and non-proliferation— were secondary ones in the administration’s China
policy.
hi light o f the above material, it is safe to suggest that American interests in China
during the second Reagan and early Bush administrations were trade-oriented. PoUcy
makers viewed the coming years in what historian Paul Cohen has termed the fallacy o f
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“modernization t h e o r y . A highly parochial and ethnocentric paradigm for viewing
history, this approach presumes that China has developed along a path to modernization
that was not unlike the road taken by western industrial nations, like the United States.
Modernization theory uncritically assumes that economic modernization occurs at a set
pace, and in certain pre-defined stages. The idea that economic reform led to political
reform was one o f these hasty presumptions. After the dream for Chinese political
hberahzation came tumbling down in the summer o f 1989, a dramatic réévaluation in
policy forced many Americans and the press to rethink this hasty assessment o f Chinese
politics. In terms o f the media coverage that reflected this monumental crisis, the
mainstream press painted a multifaceted picture o f Chinese domestic unrest that helped
reinforce the pohcy alterations formulated by the Bush administration. In essence, the
negative images that flowed firom the pages o f various magazines, in emotional tone and
content, coincided with the changing direction o f foreign policy.

Images o f Tiananmen
The road to modernization for China was difficult. Deng Xiaoping, upon coming to
power after the death o f Mao Zedong, enacted unprecedented reforms in the economic
sector that brought China into the international commercial market. Gradually, Deng
moved to decentralize many state owned enterprises, in order to allow these companies to
have private decision-making power over profits and planning. Deng realized that the
rapid development o f coastal regions and the urban environment in locales such as
Shanghai were imperative, if China was to undergo any major reforms. Accordingly, the
leadership ordered the creation o f “special economic zones” (SEZs) as a means o f
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attracting foreign investment.^'* By the middle o f the 1980s, much o f the necessary
restructuring had already taken place, and as Harry Harding notes, “overall, the Chinese
economy experienced the greatest vibrancy o f any period since 1949.”^® The

fa rm in g

communities benefited the most from this economic restructuring, because farms were
returned to private ownership and market incentives were reintroduced to rural areas
across China. However, the situation in the major coastal cities where much o f China’s
basic industry was concentrated did not fare so well.
By 1986, the urban sector began to show signs o f mass unemployment and
dislocation. In this period, due to the radical decentralization program enacted by the
Communist leadership a decade prior, governmental revenues began to stagnate
substantially. Moreover, inflation, a development that was completely foreign to a
populace that had known 0% inflation for nearly thirty years, also skyrocketed at this
time.^® Consequently, a plethora o f “serious social problem[s]” readily grew, which
eventually affected the heretofore economic boom in the rural sector. In the three years
prior to the Tiananmen demonstrations, the “transient” population o f China’s cities
increased to nearly fifiy million.^^ In many cases, nearly one-fifth o f the urban
population had fallen bellow the poverty line. In response to these developments, many
laborers, intellectuals, and state employees looked to non-govemmental means to address
these problems.
The Tiananmen demonstrations grew out o f the crisis that materiahzed from
decentralization and economic dislocation. As early as 1986, student unrest and a general
sense o f dissatisfaction with the regime led to a small demonstration that resulted in the
removal o f General Secretary Hu Yaobang from his position as head of the Chinese
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Communist P a r t y K n o w n for his reform mindedness, Hu was accused by Deng and the
Central Committee, the ruling body o f the Chinese Communist Party, of being to soft on
the students, an act that many conservatives viewed as disloyalty to the state and the
party. Hu was quickly replaced by another Deng protégé named Zhao Ziyang, but
unfortunately for the leadership, the student demonstrators reappeared in 1989.
Sparked by the death o f former secretary Hu Yaobang on April 15, 1989, university
students from Beijing University (Beida) and Beijing Normal University organized to
protest Hu’s 1987 dismissal, while calling for greater political freedom and political
democratization. In the early days o f the movement, a high percentage of students
dominated the crowds, but as the weeks passed, the social composition of the crowds
began to change radically. Historian Nan Lin notes that as “the movement gathered
momentum, the participation level reached its height in mid-May, when demonstrations
involved over a milhon participants and visitor. For example, on May 16, over a million
people visited Tiananmen Square and the hunger strikers.”^^ Urban workers protested the
massive dislocation and corruption that Deng’s “four modernizations” created, whereas
students were considerably more interested in the political zispects o f reform; hence, they
called for freedom o f the press, multi-party elections, and an end to the abuse o f power by
party officials.^® Harry Harding maintains that the sheer size o f these weekly
demonstrations caused a crisis within the party:
O f particular concern was the participation of large numbers o f industrial workers in
the protests, and the emergence o f independent labor unions. An alliance o f workers
and students, each with autonomous organizations, raised the specter o f a popular
uprising similar to what has occurred in Poland in 1980. And like the leaders o f the
Polish Communist Party, China’s gerontocrats believed that the only solution was to
impose martial law.^'
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W hen the news about the demonstrations reached the American press in the middle
o f May, the initial interpretation o f the situation in Tiananmen was quite positive. The
press saw the growth o f student and popular discontent as a sign o f the increasing
weakness o f the Communist Party and Deng Xiaoping, so the press became emotionally
sympathetic to the student cause. The philosophical aspects o f the student’s demands
were habitually stressed, in addition to the portrayal o f the “democracy” demonstrators as
the next generation o f leaders in China. The American media created a picture o f an
enhghtened hterati (the students) who sought to overturn the “mandate o f heaven.” Deng
and the revolutionary generation were described as adherents o f an anachronistic
philosophy (Leninism-Maoism), that lacked legitimacy in a free-market environment. As
M ei-ling Wang notes, the ideological position o f the media was fundamentally
unbalanced since “coverage o f the student demonstrations in Beijing stressed ideological
vigilance against communism... [and the] good fought evil in the pursuit o f Americanstyle democracy.”^^ Therefore, the images presented in the earlier non-violent stages o f
the demonstrations in many ways resembles the non-aggressive and gradual approach
that policy makers subscribed to in the previous section. Although the bellicose rhetoric
was at times antagonistic, a belief in the natural progression o f democracy against the
forces o f communist tyranny was not unlike the policy o f graduahsm outlined by the
Reagan and Bush administrations.
W ell before the violence erupted on June 4, the media was on the scene to ascertain
the nature o f the poUtical unrest. First impressions o f pub he and student solidarity led the
press to conclude that the nation was in a state o f mass hysteria. Approximately one
week before the outbreak o f violence. Time ran a full-length article that detailed the
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developments in the square. Referring to the historic visit o f Mikhail Gorbachev to the
PRC in the previous week, columnist Daniel Benjamin said that instead o f the world
focusing on the monumental visit o f Gorbachev, the attention o f the world was on
‘Tiananm en Square, where a hunger strike by 3,000 students swelled to a demonstration
o f more than a million Chinese expressing the inexpressible — a longing for freedom and
prosperity.”^^ Even more emotive and powerful was the sub-title o f the article that read
“With Tiananmen Square the epicenter, a political quake convulses C h i n a . T h e cause
o f the crisis was pruned by one reporter on the idea that conservatives were fearful that
rising unemployment and inflation in urban China might lead to “social unrest.”^®
Another article claimed that the historical turning point this demonstration represented
was beyond the power o f human action:
There is no turning back today, any more than there was in 1911, when Sun Yat-sen
overthrew the last Emperor; in 1928, when Chiang Kai-shek won control; in 1949,
when Mao Tse-tung’s Communists triumphed; or in 1977, when the reformer Deng
Xiaoping succeeded the ideologue Mao. Deng’s economic reforms have sparked a
revolution of rising expectations in China, and those expectations include political
participation as well as prosperity. China, which built the world’s greatest wall to
keep out foreign hordes, cannot keep out Western culture and ideas, borne like a
virus on radio waves and je t airplanes and carried home like influenza by students
sent abroad to learn engineering and economics.^®
The author went on to add that the democracy demonstrators brought China to a national
paralysis. All combined, the mainstream press popularized the image that the force of
student protests transcended the physical boundaries o f the square and enveloped the
country.
In response to the unrest, the nerves o f the leadership were tested in the press to see
how they responded to the public cries for democracy. Newsweek quoted Deng Xiaoping
as saying that “I had hoped that we wouldn’t have to spill blood. But if we have to do so.
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then we will.”^’ A subsequent issue succinctly summed up the extent to which the
demonstrators had ignited a national crisis, in a cover entitled “UPHEVAL IN
CHINA.”^* In line with the overall policy o f the United States government that a gradual
incorporation o f free-market ideas (hberal thinking) and prosperity would eventually
break down the authoritarian structure o f the CCP, joumahsts formulated an image o f
China as an oppressed nation on the verge o f a political breakdown. Richard M adsen’s
study o f the American reaction to this situation suggests that a political crisis o f this
magnitude is generally understood as a time o f negative chaos, so this case was an
anomaly. Tiananmen was a historic drama where the forces of freedom, morahty, and
liberty were essentially recreating their society.^^ Rather than viewing this drama as an
insignificant occurrence in a distant land, America’s ideological stance toward the
infectious power o f liberty and democracy led the media to analyze the demonstrations
from the philosophical framework o f social liberation and freedom o f thought.
Not only did the image o f a national crisis place an ethnocentric twist upon the
events, it also cemented an impression within the mind o f the American public that the
CCP’s handle on power was in decline. Dusko Doder described the dilemma that the
leadership faced by stating that to the conservatives in the party. Prime Minister Li Peng
was the most desirable choice for maintaining the status quo of authoritarianism. Zhao
Ziyang, on the other hand, was the more favorable choice for those who wanted to pursue
marketization and “greater freedom o f expression;” hence the party was caught between a
return to stagnation or reform.'*® In comparison to the economic and political rigidity of
Deng, Zhao became the new pragmatic alternative who could subdue the power o f the
“old [and] feeble” Deng. Hence, the struggle for democracy was presented not only as a
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social conflict, but an internal party conflict as well. The forces o f “pragmat[ism]”
battling against the “hard liners” were portrayed as crusaders who sought to dethrone the
revolutionary guard that was interested in social “order above all else.”'** The notion that
the conservative faction wanted to restrain the process o f inevitable social reform became
a central theme in the media. The inevitable victory o f prosperity, capitalism, and
democracy were viewed in a deterministic fashion as virtually predetermined for China.
At least to the uncritical viewer, the demonstrators seemed to embody the genuine values
o f democratic freedom and liberty.
The manner in which the demands o f the demonstrators were outlined by the
American media exemphfies the tendency on the part o f the media to view democracy as
the ultimate goal o f the demonstrations, when in reaUty most o f the demonstrators came
out in protest to support social reform, increased economic opportunity, and an end to
governmental corruption.'*^ The popular term used to describe the fundamental demand
o f the students was “democracy.” Time declared that “a profound seriousness pervaded
Tiananmen, bom o f the knowledge that people were prepared to die for democracy.” In
addition to being the guardians o f liberty, they were prepared to lay their lives on the line
for reform and freedom. Protesters accused the leadership o f “nepotism,” so democracy
became the “rallying cry o f the demonstrators.” It must be mentioned that Time
commented on the ambiguous nature o f the demands, because many students only had a
superficial knowledge o f western liberalism. The more common image o f the movement
can be summed up by Sandra Burton's statements regarding the Tiananmen sit-in. She
concluded that the students yearned for “the opposite o f everything associated with
Communist Party rule.”'*^ A brief excerpt from the same article fittingly characterized the
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western interpretation o f the protests as simply a revulsion against communism and party
rule:
The demands may be amorphous, but these can be no doubt about the passion, as
evidenced by the willingness o f ordinary people to obstruct tanks and o f hunger
strikers to court death. If anything, the absence o f an ideology, with specific longrange aims indicates ju st how powerful is the public revulsion at the party and the
entire status quo.'*'*
The tone o f mihtancy entered the picture when a statement from a poster was quoted
as having read “Chinese mlers have given democracy and freedom as gifts... we have to
seize them.” A bold statement quoted from a student suggested that the type o f
democracy the demonstrators desired was specifically “democracy on the American
model.”'*® In virtually every possible case, media sources attempted to locate signs o f an
ideological link between western hberal thought and the demands o f the students.
Although some sources argued that the student’s were devoid o f a comprehensive
ideology, statements o f the above variety painted an image o f the demonstrations as an
upsurge o f anger that desperately wanted to overturn the stagnancy o f communism. The
reports were thus tainted by an ethnocentric behef that China had chosen the natural
alternative to communism in its wholesale adoption o f hberal-democracy.
One o f the most telling pieces o f conunentary to appear in the press during the crisis
were the comments o f a student leader (Wuerkaixi) who addressed a crowd in the square.
The young man cried out to a gathering, “Chinese people still have a slave mentality.
They don’t believe their hfe is in their own control.”'*® Clearly the message in this
quotation refers to the control and power that communism had over the populace, but
there is a deeper message in this statement; the notion that by reaching out to the
democratic ideas o f the west through poUtical protest, the Chinese can overcome their
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slavish mentality through liberal thinking and democracy. Therefore, the backward
mentahty o f the Chinese can be rejuvenated if the people engage in further political
expression. Leadership under the system o f communism, according to this utterance,
binds the individual into a cultural rigidity that is synonymous with slavery.
Placing the protests into historical perspective for the western viewer was also
difficult. Naturally there was an element o f ethnocentrism in the interpretation.
Traditionally, the role o f the Chinese scholar-official in criticizing the actions o f the
emperor was extensive. Criticism was a morally expected act on the part o f officials, so
the Confucian hterati played an active part in uncovering/exposing the flaws o f a ruling
dynasty. In the tradition o f the Confucian scholar-official, the press depicted the students
in Tiananmen as a class o f officials that sought to unveil the dictatorial and corrupt nature
o f the communist party. James Wallace argued that “widespread regard for students and
scholarship has not changed,” when referring to similarities from the imperial age and the
modern-day. An earher article mentioned that protesters were influenced by progressive
western literature and as a result, they wanted to replace “China’s traditional one-man
rule” with a structure based on direct democracy.'*^ The obvious connection in this
statement is that Deng and Mao were both essentially contemporary emperors who mled
with an iron fist. Political scientist Thomas Bernstein explained the relationship between
history and the duty o f scholars to act in the interest o f society as such:
The students have struck and ancient chord in Chinese history.... It is the idea o f
the scholar-official who remonstrates with the emperor about some evil in the
kingdom the ruler should put right. The emperor won’t listen, and the scholarofficial takes his own life as a witness, or sacrifice, to the higher good.'*^
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On the whole, Deng was portrayed as a ruler in whom the populace had lost faith.
Moreover, this image complemented the more important perception that China was
moving into a new era toward democracy, headed by the valiant student demonstrators.
Americans generally think o f themselves as progressive, forward looking people.
The pace o f the consumer economy habitually reinforces within American society the
ideal o f innovation and technological progress. On a socio-philosophical level, societies
that have not developed such a future oriented outlook are often shunned by the
American press as backward, stagnant, or retrogressive. Foreign policy in the late 1980s,
as mentioned previously, concentrated on the need for the gradual integration o f market
economics into Chinese society, and the progressive outlook that is essential for such an
economy to properly function, namely liberal-democracy. As the youthful students
began to look to the west for more support in their quest for political reform, the
mainstream media rationahzed these developments as the birth of vibrant progressivism
battling the forces of stagnant socialism. A statement on one student banner read, “Deng
Xiaoping, your mind is muddled, step down and go play bridge,” while another banner
declared, “End rule by old men;” clearly a sign that China desired a socio-political
rejuvenation based on western concepts o f progressivism.'*® Other derogatory comments
firom Tiananmen banners included the call for Deng’s resignation which jokingly stated,
“a good cat knows when to retire.”®® The ideological divide that separated the role o f
elders firom the youth was masterfully presented in an article by James Wallace. “China
reveres age,” declared Wallace, “but worships children. For centuries, it was the youth’s
duty to respect the estabUshed order o f elders; now, the obligation is to overturn it.”®'
Hence, America was confironted with an assessment o f contemporary Chinese social
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philosophy that maintained the path to reform the students had chosen was founded on
westem-style, forward looking principles.
For the most part, the gradualist tone o f many o f these images, prior to the military
crackdown, complimented the non-antagonistic stance toward reform that American
foreign pohcy embodied at this time. The gradual incorporation o f market economics
and greater freedom in business were viewed as the paramount forces that unleashed a
cathartic tide o f democratic thinking in China. The sanguine perspective taken by the
press in the months o f April and May would soon change. Following the crackdown by
the mihtary on June 4, America swiftly reacted with a staunch condemnation o f the
government’s actions. After the regime moved to suppress the demonstrations, American
pohcy makers began to emphasize the unpredictable nature o f the Communist leadership.

The Image o f the Massacre in Policv
and the Press
Beginning with the mihtary suppression on the night o f June 3, America’s image o f
the Tiananmen demonstration turned into a nightmare. A wholesale condemnation o f the
government’s decision to use violence on the part o f the government pervaded the images
that the press perpetuated. The hopeful situation that joum ahsts sohcited in May now
degenerated into a deep cynicism.
No one can forget the historic photograph o f the lonely demonstrator standing in
front of the row o f moving tanks, ready to sacrifice his life for his fellow comrades. In
response to the military’s involvement in the situation, George Bush immediately cited
the example o f the lone demonstrator as an image that would haunt China for many years
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to come. Without hesitancy. President Bush stated that the United States deplored the use
o f force against the students and called on the Chinese government to exercise restraint in
dealing with the incident. Bush added that “the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square were
advocating basic human rights, including the freedom o f expression, freedom o f the
press, [and] freedom o f association. These goals we support around the w o r l d . I n a
statement o f moral support for the student cause. Bush declared:
Throughout the world we stand with those who seek greater freedom and democracy.
This is the strongly felt view o f my administration, o f our Congress, and most
important, o f the American people.®®
As a consolation to the democratic elements in China who looked to the west for moral
encouragement. Bush said that America was completely in favor o f the “budding o f
democracy” that overtook Beijing in the weeks prior. The Washington administration
now seemed more restrained about the process o f democratization, so policy changes
were made that reflected Am erica’s growing unease with the Communists in Beijing.
Although some measures were taken to show American displeasure for the sudden
bloodshed, the most essential aspect o f the previous policy was left unaltered. Hence, a
number o f initiatives o f lesser significance were enacted, but economic exchange and
basic commerce was left untouched. In his June 5 press conference, George Bush
outlined the steps that the administration had taken to protest China’s brutal measures. A
review o f student visas for extended stays o f residency, suspension o f high level military
contact, and a halt to all commercial weapons exports, was essentially Bush’s response to
the Tiananmen crackdown. On the more pertinent issue o f possible sanctions against
China, Bush eloquently answered:
On the commercial side, I don’t want to hurt the Chinese people. I happen to believe
that the commercial contacts have led, in essence, to this quest for more freedom. I
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think as people have commercial incentive, whether it’s in China or in other
totalitarian systems, the move to democracy becomes more inexorable/'^
Consequently, Bush was not willing to renege on the policy o f economic engagement that
brought prosperity to China, and o f course the Untied States. M inor variations in policy
was the extent to which the administration was willing to move on the China issue.
In subsequent weeks, the focus o f the administration shifted to a concentration on
human rights and its suppression in contemporary China. On June 8, at a press
conference regarding the turbulent situation in the PRC, the President commented that
“we [America] aren’t going to remake the world, but we should stand for something.”^^
In this statement. Bush spoke o f the notion that human rights need to become more o f a
central issue in America’s dealings with China. Moreover, on the question o f how this
tension in contact with China can be eased in the future. Bush simply answered “it will
take a recognition o f human rights o f individuals and a respect for the right o f those who
disagree [with the govemment].”^^ These amendments to the current poUcy brought the
more critical aspects o f America’s image o f China to the forefront o f the policy debate,
but the economic basis for relations with the PRC were left unchanged.
In light o f these policy changes, a clear pattern o f image formulation began to
reinforce the new set o f ideological alterations that underscored the administration’s
move to place human rights violations at the center o f its reconstructed policy, while
maintaining commercial relations as normal. A Time article mentioned that although the
United States deplored the use o f force in quelling the protests, it was unwilling to
“jeopardize” the decade-long “strategic relationship” that the two nations had painfully
constructed.^^ A further report argued that continued economic relations with China,
even after the incident in Tiananmen, was expected eventually/soon to contribute even
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further toward the democratization o f Chinese society. In the coming years, disaffected
Chinese citizens might once again collectively bring pressure upon the government for
reform in the political and economic spheres. No small mention was made o f this
possibility by jourrriist George J. Church when he wrote:
Even after the Tiananmen Square massacre. Bush and his aides still hope that
continued American trade and investment will help maintain economic fireedom and
that the dynamic force o f a liberalized economy may yet renew the pressure for
political reform.... Corporate executives would like nothing better. Western
businessmen have dreamed o f immense markets in China since the days o f Marco
Polo; for American corporations in the past few years, the dream started to come
true. From a mere $1.2 billion ten years earlier, U.S. trade with China rocketed to
$13.4 billion last year, including almost $5 billion o f U.S. exports...
Concerning the image o f human rights and the atrocities committed by the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) at Tiananmen, Bush’s spokesperson was cited by Newsweek as
having said that the Communist “government has murdered many o f its own citizens.” In
a subsequent article the memories o f a Harvard University graduate student recalled:
It was like a dream. From where I was, the sound o f crying was louder than the
gunfire, but I kept seeing people falling. One line of students would stand up and get
shot down and then another line o f student would stand and the same thing would
happen. There was gunfire from all directions. The soldiers were shooting
everyone. I don’t often cry. I went through the Cultural Revolution. I was sent to a
remote region o f China, on the border between China and Vietnam, and I have gone
through a lot. But I couldn’t help crying. I just cannot believe what I saw in Beijing.
M y worst memory, the strongest impression, was that I saw a tank run over a man
and I heard a kind o f noise, like a pong. And after that we saw his head, and it was
crushed... Later I saw four or five students hiding behind a low brick wall. They
were all crushed by a tank. The tank went to that wall because they were hiding
there. They shot students out o f the trees. What I saw is bodies, bodies, bodies.^^
A dramatic condemnation of the military crackdown ensued in the weeks following the
event, which reinforced the notion in the mind o f the American public that the
Communists were definitely human rights violators of the worst kind; tyrants willing to
suppress unarmed demonstrators seeking nothing but the unalienable rights o f democracy
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and freedom. President Bush had responded in kind with a call for restraint and political
recognition o f those seeking freedom the day after the incident, hence the press
m asterfully constructed an incredibly horrific scenario o f the events that coincided with
the revised policy o f the administration.
In summary, after the Tiananmen Square “massacre,” the American government
began to focus intensively on the highly negative and unpredictable nature o f the regime
in China. In addition, the possibility that China in the coming years could very well
become an aggressive economic and military giant in the region, was also another factor
that moved to the forefront o f the policy debate. Even though the economic stance o f the
United States remained much the same after the incident, emphasis was increasingly
placed on non-proliferation, the nature o f the communist regime, human rights, Chinese
expansionism, and relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan. Because the images that the
press produced were so volatile and culturally biased, the first chapter o f a fictional
history regarding the socio-political evolution o f China was created in the media.
Because American institutions such as the government and the press have a unique
missionary nature, in terms o f propagating American ideals abroad, the returned images
about the socio-political climate in China were tainted with an ethnocentric negativity.
Policy makers and the media refused to look past the blood that had been spilled in
Beijing to ascertain the true nature o f the incident, therefore, a skewed impression o f
these two tumultuous months was presented to the public, with only minimal information
about the deeper political, social, and cultural elements o f the Tiananmen fiasco.
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CHAPTER 4

IMAGES IN THE AFTERMATH OF TIANANMEN:
THE ERA OF UNCERTAINTY
In the wake o f the Tiananmen incident, American foreign policy toward China
underwent a thorough réévaluation. Formerly held assumptions, o f which the trajectory
o f Chinese political and economic reform were the most pertinent, were cast aside while
pohcy makers scrambled to digest the unexpected steps the CCP had taken to quell a
possible social revolution. The policy o f overt optimism that carried American foreign
policy through both the Reagan and Bush administrations effectively disappeared. The
notion that ongoing economic reform with the introduction o f market incentives would
steer China toward the path o f enhanced political freedom did not altogether vanish, but a
mood o f gradual uncertainty and apprehension regarding the nature o f Chinese
politics/economics replaced the optimism o f the previous period. For two decades prior
to the Tiananmen incident, observers in the United States witnessed an unprecedented
relaxation in the totalitarian socio-political policies o f the PRC. In the aftermath o f the
1989 military crackdown, popular images and policy initiatives were culturally adapted to
meet the needs o f the post-Cold War political climate. In effect, popular and
administrative conceptions centered on the unpredictable nature o f the PRC and the
Chinese political machine, in terms o f its adoption o f an unorthodox socialist-market
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economy, coupled with its emergence as a regional power. The American expectation for
future liberalization remained an intricate aspect o f America’s vision o f China, but
reports in government and the press increasingly stressed the tyrannical nature o f Chinese
politics, since religious, ethnic, and political dissent were repeatedly suppressed by
Chinese authorities during this period.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the foundation o f Sino-American relations
throughout the 1980s was based on a desire for enhanced commercial exchange.
Accordingly, issues pertaining to human rights, non-proliferation, and Taiwan were
relegated to second-class positions o f concern, because the prospective gains o f trade
outweighed any moral hesitations that policy makers had about the continued suppression
of religious and pohtical dissent in China. As the events following 1989 unfolded, even
though presidents Bush and William Clinton reaffirmed the necessity o f intensive
commercial contact with China, concerns regarding human rights, Taiwan, and Beijing’s
military capabilities came to the fore o f the policy debate. In essence, between 1990 and
1996, administrative appeals for a reaffirmation o f Sino-American trade continued as
they had in the years preceding Tiananmen, but the moral and strategic aspects o f the
previous policy began to receive more public attention. Ultimately, the American desire
to construct a China market based on firee-market, democratic principles drove the Bush
and Clinton administrations to engage the PRC firom a dualistic perspective. For one,
policy specifics concentrated on the image that China was quickly becoming a major
trading ally of the United States, and that access to its markets offered enormous trading
opportunities for potential investors. Secondly, China, with the memories o f the
Tiananmen crackdown still firesh in the minds o f American officials, was increasingly
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viewed as a nation that exhibited characteristics o f political unpredictability; a nation that
periodically violated international standards o f human rights, economic modernization,
and regional political interaction.

A Policv o f Ambivalence
In examining this policy o f ambivalence undertaken by the United States, its
uniqueness becomes apparent almost immediately when compared to other nations that
do not maintain extensive commercial ties with American businesses. For example,
American condenmation o f North Korean totalitarianism is not only rhetorically tied to
its policy o f political and economic isolation, it also forms the core o f a rigid policy that
virtually excluded the Stalinist state from economic interaction with the international
community. Chinese communism receives a similar degree o f moral/political criticism
from the US, but American commercial investment in China, according to Julia Chang
Bloch, has increased by approximately 620 percent between the years o f 1990 and 1995.*
Moreover, American capital in 1995 accounted for 9.6 percent o f “total foreign
investment” in that year, and the financial interaction o f American companies with
Chinese enterprises has swelled within the last decade as well. Additional research
conducted by Bloch suggests that the vast majority o f American businesses operating in
China are satisfied with their overseas ventures, given that most western companies are
profiting heavily from the benefits of low manufacturing costs in the PRC.^ Hence, when
juxtaposed with the North Korean situation and the apparent absence o f economic links
between the two nations, it becomes clear that although American ideological
motivations regarding communism initially repel even the staunchest conservative
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politicians from advocating improved bilateral relations with Beijing, the material
rewards o f a expanding market are difficult to ignore politically. Since business access
retained its preeminent position as the center-piece o f America’s China policy even after
the Tiananmen crackdown, moral aversion toward the repressive and stifling nature o f
communism collided with the allure o f monetary gain in a policy o f economic-moral
dualism.
For the purpose o f image analysis, the following paragraphs detail the combined
policy initiatives o f the Bush and Clinton administrations. Given that the official policy
o f both presidents exhibited tremendous continuity in their respective approaches toward
managing China policy, the forthcoming section examines primary source material
between 1989 and 1996. Thus, the presentation o f data will not necessarily follow a time
order sequence. Instead, the material is compiled and formatted in a manner that reflects
the level o f importance o f each issue in the era o f uncertainty.
Beginning with the Tiananmen incident and ending with the Taiwan strait crisis o f
1995-96, America’s foreign policy stance on China was characterized by a moraleconomic dualism, fri this period, administrators were caught between a desire to
enhance American trade with the PRC, and coming to terms with the perceived direction
o f Chinese socio-political developments. The conservative oligarchy, led by Deng
Xiaoping, speedily shored up military and bureaucratic support for their program in 1990.
The reform minded elite in the CCP were effectively removed from power after the
military crackdown in the square, but the party was, nevertheless, forced to make
minimal concessions in the name o f enhanced democracy and political pluralism. Hence,
Deng’s faction, now the only group with majority power in the ranks o f the party, called
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on the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) to offer additional
constructive criticism pertaining to corruption and greater democracy. Although this was
definitely a step in the direction o f reform for Beijing leaders, the political supremacy o f
Marxism and the CCP were simultaneously reaffirmed/ All measures in the avenue of
democratic entitlements relegated to extra-party bodies, such as the CPPCC, required the
tacit approval o f the party, if suggestions and recommendations were implemented. As
the Bush administration witnessed these happenings, officials concluded that
authoritarianism had once again become victorious in China. The realization that radical
communists had secured their position in Beijing fostered a sense o f unease in American
government, but the commercial linkage that had evolved through a decade o f vigorous
Sino-American bilateral contact was left intact.
With this in mind, policy makers publicly reaffirmed American trade commitments
to the PRC. Officials repeatedly turned to a description o f the post-Cold War era as one
in which the global community had become increasingly interdependent. Since the pace
o f global economic interaction substantially increased after the fall o f the Soviet Union,
officials saw a certain futility in excluding China fi-om the global marketplace. The
ascent o f the multinational corporation, a political entity that demanded open access to
markets world-wide, drove American trade policy by its insistence on enhanced
profitability, via a right o f entry to the PRC. In a politically empirical sense, the
multinational corporation had replaced the ideologically divided superpowers o f the Cold
War, as a collective set o f interests with the ability to exert political weight o f immense
proportions.
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Even before the fall o f communism, as Kenneth Mason has observed, multinational
companies were becoming the most important political-economic institutions o f the late
twentieth century/ Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard H.
Solomon described the global setting similarly by stating, “[t]he dominant trends o f this
new era, which will shape the world o f the 21** century, are an increasingly integrated
global economy sparked by spectacular technological change; the bankruptcy o f
communism as an economic and political alternative, and a world-wide trend toward
democracy and fi’ee enterprise.”^ In addition, Solomon maintained that in relation to the
economy, America had a stake in sustaining current levels o f growth, because
engagement with East Asia partially accounted for the dynamics o f the burgeoning
American economy. “U.S. trade with East Asia,” Solomon declared, “now accounts for
more than one-third o f our total foreign commerce, and our exports to East Asia now
exceed those to Europe.”^ In sum, globalization, with China as an intricate part o f the
multinational puzzle, influenced the trajectory o f foreign policy, because the unimpeded
flow o f capital to export markets, even to nations with questionable political systems,
was a prerequisite for success in post-communist economics.
Although not as rhetorically secure in their assertion as before the Tiananmen crisis,
administrators stressed their belief in the reformist nature o f economic liberalization, and
its direct impact on the political climate o f a nation. In a 1996 interview. President Bill
Clinton summed up this argument when stating, ‘T believe they’re more likely to become
democratic if they progress economically... [because] economic development and
democracy will go hand in hand.”^ In actuality, given the tone o f the above statement.
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the core o f the pre-Tiananmen policy initiatives were carried into the next decade Hby
subsequent administrations.
Prior to Tiananmen, human rights, the issue o f Taiwan, and China’s military
capabilities, for the most part, were divorced from the issue o f bilateral commerce. These
facets o f policy were relegated to positions o f marginal concern and were overshaciowed
by the administrative yearnings for open access to the Chinese economy. These
previously diffused aspects o f international relations merged in the era o f uncertaimty
with the issue o f China trade, which advanced the idea that moral considerations amd
tangible gains for America were necessary in order to continue the current import-esxport
relationship.
One area in which the fusion o f economic and moral imperatives collided was #on the
question o f public benefits that bilateral relations presented for average Americans.
Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, in a 1996 testimony presented to the House W ay's and
Means Trade Subcommittee, testified that Americans owed much to bilateral comnuerce
with the PRC, because the existence o f as many as 160,000 jobs in the United S ta te s were
associated with American exports to China.* The pre-Tiananmen justifications offerred by
administrative officials differed greatly from the above statement. Before, lucrativebenefits for business in China stood as the primary reason for a need to further
commercial interaction, but in the early 1990s, appeals to popular support became nnore
numerous by claiming that bilateral trade was profitable for average citizens in the fibrm
o f growing employment opportunities associated with exports to East Asia.
Scholars who study the periodic alterations o f policy in relation to domestic fac to rs
and political variables site the growing influence o f American populism for this s h if t in
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attitudes. In the United States, political constituents, in the form o f patriotic citizens who
view globalism as a threat to American sovereignty, form a substantial portion o f the
domestic voting block. Many Americans, particularly farmers from the Midwest and
other agriculturally productive regions, perceive the political affluence o f multinational
corporations and the relocation o f production facilities as a process that will ultimately
undermine America’s political sovereignty and economic security. David M. Lampton
argues that these nationalistic sentiments contributed to the amplification o f nationalistic
populism in the early 1990s, as politicians, namely Pat Buchanan, sought to harness the
political weight o f these disenchanted elements within the American body politic.^
Within the post-Tiananmen socio-political miheu, outright appeals for corporate market
fortification became insufficient, so policy makers presented the public with greater
assurance that commercial contact with China was morally and nationally beneficial to
average Americans, many o f whom were under the distinct impression that American
jobs were being transplanted to a nation that functioned under questionable economic,
social, and political principles.
The unpredictable nature o f Chinese culture was another variable that contributed to
the proliferation o f the image that China operated under unorthodox modes o f politicaleconomic advancement. Notwithstanding the positive tone o f Clinton’s prediction that
commercial liberalization fostered political reform, the expectations o f a smooth
transition to wholesale capitalism and democracy were generally more reserved in this
period. In 1990, the State Department announced that within the Chinese heritage, an
adherence to tradition and custom prevented reform from occurring at a rapid pace. A
tradition o f centralized authority, communal security, and elite political conflict in
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decision making were barriers to modernization that needed international recognition.
For functional relations to move forward. Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger maintained
that these time-honored customs were deeply imbedded in the Chinese, and America
needed to bridle any unrealistic expectations for overnight reform in China.

Additional

images o f Chinese cultural anachronism appeared in 1996 as well, when Under Secretary
o f State for Political Affairs Peter T am off commented that the Chinese nation, as a
important component o f international politics, had yet to comply with internationally
recognized norms and behavioral standards, in terms o f the regime’s political behavior.
With regard to economic restructuring, Jan Prybyla noted that a “gradualist and relatively
pragmatic approach to institutional reform” had been the trademark o f Chinese
restructuring since 1978, when Deng Xiaoping enacted his program for national
modernization. ** More importantly, the 1989 ascent o f the conservative oligarchy stalled
the abandonment o f these moderate policies, a process the United States hoped would
progressively quicken. For this reason, Tam off explained, “China [was] at a critical
juncture,” and the United States needed to act as an “encouraging” agent for the Chinese
people.*^ Therefore, if China was to become an equal player in multinational commerce,
the overarching hand o f government regulation and political rigidity required jettisoning.
In summary, the image o f China from these various government publications suggests
that a dualistic ambivalence o f market engagement and political uncertainty battled for
preeminence in this phase o f Sino-American relations.
The m ost fiercely debated aspect o f the cross-cultural ambivalence discussed above
is the annual congressional renewal o f Most Favored Nation (MFN) status for the PRC.
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To avoid an international confrontation with Beijing, President Bush resisted
congressional appeals for a revocation o f MFN following the Tiananmen crackdown.
Under the provisions of MFN, nations with vibrant market economies and democratic
systems o f government are awarded the status permanently, however, non-market
economies, due to the Jackson-Vanik amendment in the Trade Act o f 1974, are granted
MFN on an annual basis only.

As a tool for leverage against the human rights practices

o f China, MFN became the yearly centerpiece o f debate among proponents and
opponents o f China trade. As an issue o f contention, the granting o f MFN to a regime
that stifled democratic outpourings and suppressed anti-communist dissent has, at times,
strained Sino-American relations.*'*
Interestingly enough, since Tiananmen, a presidential-congressional rift has
materialized regarding the MFN issue; a conflict pitting congressional hard-liners who
denounce Chinese authoritarianism against proponents o f free-trade and intensive
marketization. Congress views the clause o f annual renewal as a yearly monitoring
mechanism that functions as an incentive for the Chinese government in improving its
human rights record. The Bush and Clinton administrations claimed that by granting
China MFN, the liberalizing effect o f intensive market expansion would assist the cause
o f human rights advocates in prying China open to western values and standards o f
conduct. Even though Bush insisted on separating the issue o f trade and human rights
with regard to this issue, Clinton however, upon having been elected, pledged that
America’s commitment to freedom could only be demonstrated by linking the MFN
debate with improvements in the treatment o f dissident voices in China. *^ The Clinton
strategy for extracting political concessions from Beijing was in part only rhetorical.
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because his bellicose tone became more conciliatory after several months into the new
administration. In terms o f the socio-political image created by the MFN debate, the
conflict in government clearly exemplified the moral ambivalence that American
politicians suffered from in the aftermath o f Tiananmen.
The argument offered by the administrations for granting China the measure was
based primarily on the conjecture that a revocation o f MFN would lead to economic
tensions in China, and an abandonment o f American ideals. In a 1991 commencement
ceremony at Yale University, Bush stood firm in his position that a denial o f MFN could
exacerbate tensions in an already fragile program for economic reform. The president
added that withholding approval was counterproductive for American interests because it
thwarted efforts at encouraging privatization and increasing respect for “hiunan rights” in
China. “The m ost compelling reason to renew MFN and remain engaged in China,”
declared Bush, “is not economic, is not strategic, but moral. It is right to export the ideals
o f freedom and democracy to China.” *® Moreover, in opposition to those who sought to
deny MFN to China, Bush argued that “[cjritics who attack MFN today act as if the point
is to punish China, as if hurting China’s economy will somehow help the cause o f
privatization and human rights.” *^ The use o f the measure, therefore, served a dual
purpose. For one, it allowed for the advancement o f American socio-philosophical ideals
abroad, and second, it furthered the well being o f the Chinese populace by promoting the
interests o f privatization and individual proprietorship.
While Bush steadfastly backed this policy for the remainder o f his second term
through a policy o f “engagement,” Clinton reassured Americans that he planned a similar
course o f action. Termed “comprehensive engagement,” the Clinton policy sought an
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expansion of commercial relations with the PRC because China was quickly emerging as
the next economic powerhouse in East Asia. The image o f China as “a vital source o f
export revenues and jobs” ** took shape at this time, with the concomitant image o f moralpolitical ambivalence attached to the former image. Officials reiterated claims that
extending MFN was imperative, if America wanted to continue a “constructive
relationship with China now and in the future.”*^ In summary, the lucrative opportunities
that China trade offered American businesses and average citizens in the form o f
employment became the hallmark o f the comprehensive engagement policy, but anxiety
about the treatment o f Chinese dissidents and their imprisonment was repeatedly attached
to this political-economic dialogue.
In the early 1990s, the Tiananmen incident became the rallying cry for American
human rights advocates within the ranks of government. The sporadic mention of
communist repression was not uncommon in the circles o f government and the mass
media prior to 1989, but Tiananmen served as a galvanizing force that cemented the
opinion among many Americans that China operated outside o f the boundaries o f
universal human rights standards.
Definitionally, the concept o f human rights has become a controversial terms in
recent years. At the center o f the debate is the question o f whether a western definition o f
human rights is apphcable to the Chinese cultural experience, or is the notion of
universality in the concept an ethnocentric fallacy. From a purely westem-based
perspective, the apparent nonexistence o f individualism and the historical de-emphasis on
individual human motivations in China have been points o f contention between China
and the United States since these civilizations came into contact with one another. In the
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Euro-American tradition, the concept o f the self has served as the point o f origin for
philosophical claims concerning the idea o f human universality and cross-cultural
standards o f morality.
It would be a misconception, however, to suggest that limited-personalism is not a
venue for the cultivation o f philosophical and individual morality in Chinese culture. As
William Theodore de Bary has argued, even during the Maoist regime, the Communist
Party appealed to the Confucian tradition o f self-cultivation as a means o f improving the
socio-moral bonds of socialism.^® Unfortunately for the government, the appeals o f party
elite in this admirable endeavor proved unsuccessful, since the political confines o f
communism prevented the genuine growth o f human virtue on a personal level.
After the tumultuous decade o f the Cultural Revolution and the political chaos o f the
1970s, Jing Lin maintains that a growing number o f Chinese students turned to the
western conception o f human rights and freedom, as a means o f locating a sense o f
personal identity within the modem world. Disenchanted with the radicalism o f
Marxism-Maoism, these students looked to the west as a guide for constructing the basis
o f civil society in post-Mao China.^* Notwithstanding the desire for the wholesale
incorporation o f western liberalism into China, the intellectual adaptations o f this era
blended communitarian elements o f the Chinese intellectual tradition with western
Liberalism. In effect, the essence o f western individualism and a genuine respect for the
power o f individual human abilities received minimal treatment by these scholars, for the
individual self, as a historically reemerging concept in Chinese culture, has often been
misinterpreted as egotism and selfishness. As Tu Wei-ming explains:
The Enlightenment assertion, implicit in virtually all declarations o f human rights,
that the individual has inalienable rights, and that individualism as the doctrine o f
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protecting the dignity, autonomy, and independence o f the private person is a
hallmark o f the liberation o f the human spirit, has never been fully appreciated by the
Chinese intelligentsia. The Confucian idea that selfhood, as a center o f relationships,
realizes itself in communal participation has so much dominated the Chinese
discourse on self and society that individualism is often misunderstood as selfcenteredness.^^
Therefore, two avenues o f misunderstanding and ambiguity exist in the America-Chinese
understandings o f human rights. First, conservatives and liberals alike in the United
States assert that the communist government’s notion of human rights — emphasis on
order, community, social stability, and a duty to society and state — is actually the
antithesis o f human individuality. Second, the Chinese intelligentsia’s adaptation o f
certain aspects o f western liberalism is a cross-cultural aberration in the minds o f many,
because the western scientific definition o f human rights is universally valid in its
entirety. For these reasons, the post-Tiananmen period witnessed a systematic attempt on
the part o f the United States to discredit the political program o f the CCP as an exercise
in tyranny and authoritarianism.
This definitional conflict is best exemplified in the Bush administrations comments
about the self-evident validity o f personal freedom and libertarian values, fri a 1989
address before the annual meeting o f the World Bank/IMF, Bush clarified this position
when stating, “[w]e know what works. Freedom works.... We know how to secure a
more just and prosperous life for man on earth — through free markets, free speech, free
elections, and the exercise o f free will unhampered by the state.”^* In this utterance, the
president not only commented on the importance o f national governments in
guaranteeing individual freedoms as a universal value in itself, he also tied capitalism and
free-market enterprise into the complex o f variables that contribute to human prosperity
and self-determination. The following year, the administration reaffirmed the stance
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outlined by Bush in the previous year. American judgments o f human rights in China,
according to State Department personnel, were not culturally determined condemnations
rooted in cultural traditions and norms. Rather, “universally recognized principles”^'* o f
human decency and standards o f morality were at the core o f presidential policies related
to China. Hence, market forces were viewed as the most effective mechanism for
opening the PRC to unorthodox ideas, and an image o f China materialized from these
statements that its political culture violated international norms o f proper behavior.
This cross-cultural perception becomes crystal clear in the perpetual references made
by government concerning the Tibetan people’s yearning for independence, and the
alleged atrocities committed by the communists in the remote province. Communist
authorities, since the promulgation o f Tibet as an autonomous region o f the PRC in 1951,
have actively sought the incorporation o f ethnic Tibetans into the cultural milieu o f
greater China. Currently, a process o f steady acculturation characterizes the Han Chinese
policy toward ethnic Tibetans. During the mid 1980s, the Chinese central government
enacted a policy o f modernization and cosmopolitanization for the province, by providing
large government subsidies for companies that invested in Tibet. Aimed at slowly
incorporating the region into the overall plan for national modernization, the CCP sought
the development o f the local infrastructure as a means o f “increasing their income and
reducing their isolation” from the rest o f C h i n a . T h e nationalistic elements within
Tibet, particularly the Dalai Lama and patriotic Buddhists, view the communist policy
not as a gesture o f benevolent modernization, but as the systematic eradication o f their
traditional culture. Hence, nationalists in Tibet resent the presence o f the Han as an
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unwanted horde o f foreigners who have little or no regard for the cultural integrity o f the
Tibetan people.
As a symbol o f international pride and territorial integrity for Beijing, Tibet is a
crucial area o f contention for communist leaders who seek to dislodge the weight o f
separatist and nationalistic elements in China. In Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, as Zheng
Yongnian suggests, a growing ethnic separatist movement has surfaced within the past
decade. In Xinjiang province alone, some thirty bombing incidents were reported in
1994. Perpetrated by militant separatists, the terrorists demanded the creation o f an
independent east Turkestan and autonomy from communist China.^® In similar outbursts
o f violence, Buddhist monks and Tibetan extremists have periodically attacked
government and PLA assets, which has resulted in public rioting in Lhasa and swift
military intervention by Chinese authorities. Taken as a legitimate part o f greater China,
the central government has stood firm on the independence issue, because the
maintenance o f Tibet is now viewed as an illustration o f the central government’s ability
to wield power and suppress dissent on a national level.
Naturally, the above issue, at least within the American government and media,
became associated with the Chinese disregard for human rights and ethnic pluralism. In
1990, a State Department spokesperson declared that “we believe firmly that Tibetans
should not be prosecuted by Chinese authorities for peacefully expressing their views and
also for their religious beliefs.”^^ The Clinton administration continued this tradition o f
moral outrage against Beijing when it claimed that reports from the province suggested
that continued suppression o f religious freedom and public association were ongoing in
Tibet. In fact, arbitrary arrests, torture, and criminal conviction without due process
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characterized Beijing’s unofficial policy toward the local populace/* In certain cases, the
M FN question was juxtaposed with the alleged abuse of Tibetans. Nevertheless, the
United States government reassured the public that additional privatization and capitalism
were the solutions in assisting the dire situation o f ethnic dissidents and political
prisoners.
In the era o f ambivalence, the climactic event that triggered public and government
opinion in an aggressively anti-Chinese direction was the Taiwan Strait incident. As a
sufficient example for Americans in affirming the potentially belhgerent motivations o f
the PRC toward its neighbors, the military exercises and live missile tests conducted by
the mainland galvanized government and public opinion against China. Before 1995, the
actual viciousness o f the Chinese Communist Party, other than with regard to the
Tiananmen crackdown, were addressed only in brief. However, beginning with the
military exercises undertaken by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the
Taiwan Strait prior to the presidential elections in Taiwan, American images o f political
uncertainty and Chinese aggressiveness came to the fore o f the policy debate.
The United States wasted no time in presenting Taiwan with military assistance to
deter a prospective communist invasion. Ambassador Winston Lord, following the
tactical operations conducted by the PLAN, warned that the region had witnessed a
momentary period o f instability as the Chinese test-fired missiles within just miles o f the
i s l a n d . T w o months prior to this statement. President Clinton warned that the United
States supported the “one China policy,” and it was in the best interest o f the region if
both parties, namely China and Taiwan, “clearly understood” America’s commitment to
bilateral peace.^° This stance o f involvement, as Clinton knew all too well, directly
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brought the PRC and the United States Navy into a position o f possible conflict, if
tensions between the parties flared. As Li Ziaobing has commented, a “duel strategy”
was combined by the late Mao Zedong on the question o f Taiwan that utihzeed diplomacy
and “militancy.”** In the tradition o f Mao, the opinions expressed by B eijin g nearly two
decades later followed a similar path; for the CCP applied militant diplom acy toward
Taiwan when the strategy was in its own geo-political interest. The United SStates,
however, rejected the PRC approach as “saber rattling” and as an act o f crosss-strait
militancy. Thus, Clinton pledged American diplomatic intervention in the diispute, and
adamantly called for a peaceful settlement to the crisis. Secretary o f State WTarren
Christopher echoed this posture in a 1996 press briefing when he declared;
The United States strongly believes that the resolution o f the issues betw-een the PRC
and Taiwan must be peaceful. We were gravely concerned when China’=s military
exercises two months ago raised tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Our deploym ent o f
naval forces to the region was meant to avert any dangerous miscalculations. We are
encouraged that both sides have now taken steps to reduce tensions.
In all, American fears o f Chinese expansionism, notwithstanding the fact that the PRC
considers the resolution of the Taiwan issue a domestic predicament, were coKifirmed by
Beijing’s show o f force in the region.
As the transitional event that sparked American interest about the possibi hty o f
Chinese expansionism in the region, the Taiwan crisis cemented fears in the nninds o f
Americans that China might become the successor to the Soviet Union as the mext major
international adversary of the United States. The situation marked the beginning o f a
new era in which American diplomatic and cultural images o f China focused o n the
notion that China was a rising power in Asia, and a likely threat to international stability
and peace. The image of a positive-negative duality was cast aside after the T'aiwan
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debacle, and Americans increasingly perceived communist China as an Asian adversary
with hostile intentions toward the international community.

Popular Images o f China: The Era o f Confusion
The post-Tiananmen assumption, ideas, and stereotypes o f American policy makers
mirrored the cultural inclinations o f the popular press. In much the same manner as
policy makers, journalists repeatedly detailed political, economic, and social
developments in China from a rabidly anti-communist perspective. The once sanguine
and positive images o f a modernizing nation coming to terms with a market-oriented
world were replaced with much hamher criticisms o f China’s political-economic
structure. However, a faith in the politically reconstructive power of commerce and the
Chinese people’s yearning for freedom were depicted in the press as domestic forces that
could not be ignored permanently by communist hardliners. Still, the general tone o f
media coverage was critical o f Chinese human rights standards, regional expansionism,
and the political unpredictability o f the CCP. Although the image o f an open Chinese
market for American exports filled the pages o f magazines in the former half o f the
1990s, the previously marginalized concerns o f human rights and political belligerence
moved to the fore o f media coverage. This genuine ambivalence created a dualistic
picture o f China as a land o f economic plenty and a possible menace in the years to come.
In the wake o f the Tiananmen incident, the American press recanted its previously
held position that the democracy demonstrations had reshaped the political landscape o f
the country. Because the ideological strength o f liberal-democracy and the desire for
freedom manifested with tremendous popular support in 1989, the press reluctantly clung
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to the idea that although freedom had been contained in the short term, capitalism and
consumerism were embryonic forces that no totalitarian regime, regardless o f its level o f
oppressiveness, could effectively stifle. In this regard, media correspondents depicted the
Chinese populace as a mass o f individuals caught between traditional notions o f
communitarian dedication and consumerist freedom.
The media endorsed the idea that Chinese industriousness and hard work were better
suited for capitalist economic systems, that would make more efficient use o f the Chinese
work ethic. In support o f this proposal. Time columnist Michael Kramer wrote, “the
people seem energetic, if fitful; a fifth o f the world’s population in a cage. Good,
hardworking people who deserve better than the suffocating Communism that limits their
enterprise.”*^ Also, the existence o f a powerful market culture that cast aside communist
ideology and central-govemment directives was depicted as the future o f an economically
maturing nation. Guangdong, one o f China’s most financially prosperous provinces, was
said to have “[mjore than 2 million residents work for foreign joint ventures, making
small fortunes by Chinese standards. Evidence o f Guangdong’s fast-lane corporate
culture is everywhere at hand. The parking lot at the Aide Electronic Rice Cooker plant
overflows with Mercedes-Benz cars.”** The article went on to add that state ideology
was o f little or no importance to these entrepreneurally minded individuals. Apparently,
the locals were more interested in technical training and “practicality” than the
ideological dogmatism o f Marxism and Maoism.*'* These report, from a cross-cultural
perspective, reacted to the legacy o f what historian Lucian Pye has termed the “ritualistic
symbolism” o f Chinese political culture.*® In order to maintain political cohesiveness, a
principle tradition o f social order in China has dogmatically affirmed the power o f the
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central government in manufacturing political unity. Viewed as a symbol o f
retrogressiveness and political stagnancy, western journalists depicted this tradition in the
most negative o f terms. Therefore, as the new driving force behind reform and laissezfaire capitalism, the culture o f the market was portrayed as transforming a backward land
into a technologically advanced society.
Another cultural assumption that was fostered by the media at this time was the
notion o f Chinese consumerism. Chinese contact with foreign firms and products has
progressively increased since Deng enacted the “four modernizations” program. Soon
after the announcement o f the plan, western consumer goods from Europe and the United
States began flowing into the PRC, as a result of heightened commercial contact between
China and the west. Within a decade, according to press reports, a consumer culture that
craved western made merchandise had emerged. A 1994 Newsweek article quickly
concluded that “[tjhere is no longer any doubt: China cares about its athlete’s foot
problem. Johnson & Johnson subsidiary made sure of that.”*® Author Steven Strasser
added that the populace has a fascination with anything foreign, so “Maxwell House
coffee commercials [gave] China’s tea-drinking proletariat an otherworldly scene of
elegant Westerners on an Italian terrace.”*^ The source o f marketization and the current
social revolution, interestingly enough, was not completely o f foreign influence because a
deep-seated pragmatism was imbedded in the Chinese psyche.
The media image o f China in the last decade o f the millennium was o f a nation that
had been reborn; a populace that was collectively liberating itself firom the socio
economic limitations o f socialism/utopianism. This pragmatism was described by the
Shenyang Toyota parts chairman when stating, “don’t waste your time on theory... if the
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company is making money, then we’re successful.”** In response to this statement, the
author predicted that chairman Zhao Xiyou “may yet be on his way to becoming China’s
Henry Ford.”*^ The private sector was not the only influential group in society that was
spearheading change. M any high-level officials within the communist hierarchy were
characterized as advocates o f market reform and privatization. The top families in the
communist network were already heavily involved in firee-market investment, and they
had the potential o f leading the country in a commercially oriented direction. In
combination with pragmatic leaders fi"om the coastal provinces, they “represented the
most powerful emerging Chinese faction: those who want to go full speed ahead...
without any rules or regulations to limit the greed, power, and connections of the
insiders.”'*® In essence, a fundamentally ingrained pragmatism or culture o f practicality
presented China with a vision o f fireedom and prosperity for the future.
Not entirely absent fi*om this picture was the enormous benefit that the Chinese
marketplace offered for American corporate interests. The exaltation o f the China
market was not a new inter-cultural phenomena bom in this period. Historian David L.
Anderson has noted that as far back as the late nineteenth century, American diplomats
and merchants fantasized about the prospects o f opening up China to the outside world.'**
In furthering the interest o f American commerce. Presidents Reagan and Bush were
committed to a prosperous bilateral trade relationship with China. The expected downfall
or steady collapse o f communism, however, did not manifest in midst o f the Tiananmen
demonstrations. Nevertheless, pohcy makers haphazardly clung to their original thesis
that commerciahzation would eventually bring about the destruction o f authoritarianism.
In conjunction with the American economy, press reports tied the prospective growth o f
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the domestic economy with the fortunes that could be amassed from accessing a nation o f
1.2 billion consumers. “The government’s call [for communications technology] has
been answered by U.S. and foreign giants Uke Alcatel, AT&T, Ericsson, M otorola... all
hooked by a seemingly boundless market o f 1.2 billion Chinese.”^^
The juxtaposition o f human rights with commerce was another key feature o f many
articles that addressed bilateral economic relations. An article o f brief length in Time
succinctly summarized the administration’s policy on this issue by stating, “the
question... is not whether the U.S. should pressure Beijing to improve its human rights
record. The question is how best to do it while ensuring that America gets a piece o f the
action in the world’s fastest growing economy. The two interests seem antithetical, but
they are not.”^^ Other than the abihty for foreign companies to tap into a virgin market,
the inherent paradox o f bourgeoning capitahsm in an officially communist country was
commented on by media personnel as well. When the Soviet system crumbled under the
pressure o f financial stagnation and internal political chaos, both the political and the
economic structures o f Russian Federation were reconfigured along liberal-democratic
lines o f operation. The fact that state communism had survived the outpouring o f
criticism in Tiananmen baffled many journalists, so an actual understanding o f how
Chinese market-socialism fimctioned was difficult for many to comprehend. The
apparent ambiguity present within the nature o f the new economic system is observable
in John Rothchild’s article on this question:
As you no doubt have heard, China is the world’s biggest emerging market: 1.2
billion potential consumers for cars, TV sets, patio furniture, all the stuff w e’ve
already got. This is the era o f global investing, it is said, and the sophisticated
investor can’t afford to ignore China, an exciting economy with a great future,
because the most ardent capitahsts you’ll ever meet are the Chinese communists."^
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In much the same fashion as policy makers, the popular press concentrated extensively on
prying open the Chinese market to foreign access and material consumption. But just as
administrators were quick to realize that large-scale reform provided not only for foreign
investment but domestic financial prosperity as well, the media also began to view the
boom in the Chinese economy with a certain degree o f hesitancy.
Politically, the Chinese military demonstrated its capacity for social repression in
1989. Even though privatization o f state enterprises proceeded at a steady pace in the
years following the Tiananmen crackdown, American investors, public officials, and
media personnel feared that Chinese marketization would result in the creation o f an East
Asian economic giant with malevolent intentions. During the 1980s, Japan held the
preeminent position as the economic success story o f East Asia. By the early years o f the
next decade, a Time article speculated that “relations between China and the U.S. will
shape the world in the 21^ century.”"*^ Therefore, the media caught onto the notion that
China, not Japan, was becoming the rising economic power in the East, an image echoed
by journalist Joe Klein in an article entitled “Why China Does It Better.”"*^ According to
Klein’s observation, the absence of a strong control mechanism, namely the state,
allowed Chinese business the requisite freedom for healthy innovation and growth. In
addition, this relative autonomy firom control mechanisms contributed to the hitherto
unexpected increase in China’s gross national product.
Klein did not neglect to mention the idea that capitalism and the merchant ethic ran
through the cultural heritage o f the Chinese. In citing the impressions o f one Japanese
diplomat who commented upon the phenomena, the official concluded that the “Chinese
are a nation o f merchants.”"^^ This fear o f Chinese economic expansionism and its
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possible long-term ramifications fueled a sense o f unease in the voice o f the diplomat,
who predicted that the “Chinese brand o f commerce eventually could overwhelm the
more controlled Japanese model.”"^* A significantly negative aspect o f this model o f
commerce was its lack o f governmental oversight, since Beijing retained only minimal
economic control over the actions and pohtical/economic decisions o f local entrepreneurs
and business moguls. Relaxation o f central planning provided for expeditious

p lan n in g

and opportunities at the village and township levels, but the downsizing of the state sector
left local official-merchants out o f the reach o f government authorities. British China
scholar Gerald Segal, in a 1994 Newsweek article sub-titled “The Central Government is
Losing Control,”"^^ argued that Beijing’s insistence that it maintain control over provincial
enterprise, politics, and planning was simply a façade, because provincial officialmerchants operated autonomously; outside o f central planning directives.
Another set o f images that clearly dovetails the previous section concerning the
economic prowess o f China is the notion that China sought to join the international
commercial/political community under its own terms or political guidelines — that is, a
rogue nation among more responsible nations. Mortimer Zuckerman, in commenting
upon the incremental pace at which reform in China is moving, described the nature o f
Chinese modernization as “pragmatic” and “ad hoc” capitalism.^° After having received
advice firom American economists and political tacticians, in Zuckerman’s view, China
opted for an unorthodox approach to restructuring its antiquated system o f socialism.
With regard to the trajectory o f Chinese economic policy, Zuckerman wrote “China has
listened but is going its own w ay... groping across the river by feeling the stones.”^*
Because Americans had encountered a nation where resource facihtation/allocation and
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investment decisions were simultaneously socialist and capitalist, a general sense o f
unease characterized the tone o f many press reports at this time. The socialist market
economy o f China, in the opinion o f Steven Butler, was described cynically by China’s
East Asian neighbors as a “Chinese brand o f swashbuckling capitalism.”^^ American
businesses and investors world-wide expected that a culture o ffair trade and the rule o f
law would eventually develop in China, so the clear absence o f these regulatory forces
fostered a sense o f hesitancy about foreign involvement in the Chinese domestic
economy.
In relation to their anachronistic system o f central economic planning, the Chinese
mode o f commercial exchange became an additional focal point for those journalists who
sought to unmask the chaos behind comprehensive socio-economic reform. In many
instances, the idea that China circumvented international rules o f commerce flooded the
pages o f the popular press, in addition to the assertion that a cunning market culture had
evolved in China; a culture that ignored the legal rights o f foreign and domestic investors.
Similar to allegations o f Chinese thievery and underhandedness that characterized
American images o f Chinese “coolie” laborers a century ago, image formulators
propagated the thesis that although China was in the midst o f a massive economic
overhaul (deregulation), significant impediments thwarted comprehensive reform in the
areas o f commercial law, equal access to joint-ventures, and most importantly intellectual
property rights. Newsweek sited the complaints o f one foreign businessman in 1995 who
admitted that enormous hurdles prevented optimum levels o f capital accumulation, since
92 percent o f computer software in China was o f pirated origin.^^ Similar complaints
were voiced about the sale o f foreign music and movies. Russell Watson summed up the
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situation aptly when stating, “[ejveryone does it, but no one does it like the Chinese, who
have turned illegal copying into a $1 billion-a-year racket. They have flooded their own
cities and world markets with ripoffs o f American-music CDs.”^"* Other cases o f patent
theft and illegal duphcation o f non-Chinese products stressed the perplexing idea that the
vast majority o f Chinese simply accepted bootlegging as a natural component o f market
freedom. With regard to modified sport utility vehicles that ran under the name o f Jeep
Cherokee but were generic replicas, the Chrysler Company president admitted how
baffled he was that “the Chinese see nothing wrong with this.”^^ In all, the investor’s
paradise that Americans lauded in one breath, was condemned as a commercially unsafe
and treacherous environment in another. China had evolved, in the assessment o f the
press, into an economically anarchic nightmare in which multinational corporations were
prone to unstable market forces.
For most westerners, the military might unleashed upon the democracy
demonstrators in 1989 was the work o f a political regime that utterly disregarded
universal standards o f human rights. State Department documents from this period
confirm this position, for America’s policy makers repeatedly expressed concern for the
human rights “record” o f China. Based on western and American ideological precepts
proclaiming the universality o f democracy and representative government, media
personnel took a stance o f firmness on this issue. More than any other set o f images
present within press articles, the notion o f tyranny and political repression formed the
core o f popular attitudes toward Chinese human rights. In brief, the catalyst for the
creation o f this series o f cross-cultural assumptions was the suppression o f political
dissent by the Chinese government. Rather than presenting these images in mass, image
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formulators broke down the most serious violations o f human decency into four distinct
categories: MFN and cheap labor, the status o f women in contemporary China, and the
attempt on the part o f Beijing to stifle ethnic nationalism in Tibet.
The United States Congress, since 1989, has viewed the annual renewal o f Most
Favored Nation (MFN) for China as the primary tool in Washington’s arsenal for
extracting concessions on issues pertaining to human rights. In rhetorically stressing the
violent character o f the CCP and the PLA, administrators and elements within the
American media linked these topics together and effectively created an image that
political and social rights in modem China were on America’s bilateral agenda with the
PRC. In a 1990 column discussing the political position o f the Bush administration and
MFN, Newsweek reported the president as having warned, “I don’t want to send a signal
that we are happy [with the Chinese] human rights r e c o r d . I n relation to the renewal
o f MFN and the corporate use o f Chinese low-cost labor in China, a picture o f Chinese
textile and consumer goods manufacturing materialized, in which inexpensive exports
were said to have inundated the international market. Once again, the Chinese were
depicted as a cunning breed o f businessmen who cast aside even the most basic protocols
o f employer-labor relations; namely a neglect for decent wages. Journalist Tom Post
warned that as China “dumped” products “made by prisoners” into the global
marketplace, American companies simultaneously suffered exclusion from certain
markets in which the Chinese repeatedly underbid American based companies.^^ If that
were not enough, even the historically revered employees o f state-owned firms were
forced to work under less than acceptable conditions o f work. These dreadful labor
standards included virtually no time o ff and company fines for illness, to name but a
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few.^® One engineer who worked for a joint-venture enterprise was quoted ais having
admitted, “people are being worked beyond reasonable limits and than docked if they
don’t.”^^ The M FN question tied in wonderfully with these cross-cultural assessm ents, as
evidenced by Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen’s succinct declaration regarciing the
renewal o f MFN. Bentsen claimed that America detested the use o f prison labor, and
would only grant M FN on the condition that “overall, significant progress” w/as made in
the area o f human rights.*^® As the preeminent weapon for the United States Ln pursuing
its ideological disposition for establishing social-democracy and capitalism i o China,
MFN and human rights took center-stage in the era o f American ambivalences toward the
PRC.
The status o f women, notwithstanding the assertion o f the CCP that attemtion to
women’s issues was a primary concern for the party, became a point o f intere?st for
American joum ahsts during Hilary Clinton’s visit to China in m id-1995. In oane notable
instance, Susan Lawrence dismissed the Maoist slogan that “women hold up taalf the
sky”^* as simply a pseudo-communist myth. The economic standing o f many Chinese
had been raised with the ascent o f Deng Xiaoping and the introduction o f the rfour
modernizations, but workplace rights for women and equal opportunity emplo»yment,
according to Lawrance, were “often cast aside” in an effort to maximize p ro fit at the
expense o f gender eq u ality .E ffectiv ely , corporate profits were more im portant within
the sociahst market system than the equality o f the sexes. The First Lady, in am effort to
speak out on behalf o f the politically voiceless, echoed many o f the above criticism s
during her trip to China for the Fourth World Conference on Women. One rep o rt
predicted that if Beijing attempted to suppress these critical voices during the conference.
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the government “may end up creating its own worst nightmare: a big group o f angry
feminists with some particular gripes about C h i n a . T h r o u g h this manner o f reporting,
Americans m oved toward a negative understanding o f gender and social conditions
within contemporary China.
Independent reports o f human rights abuses from organizations such as Human
Rights Watch contributed to the infusion o f the popular image that government brutality
was rampant in state-run orphanages. The concomitant assumption that the national onechild policy breached the right o f individuals in deciding parental issues added a distinct
tone o f negativity to the already tarnished image o f the CCP as a monolithic, totaUtarian
entity. In detailing the living conditions within these orphanages, Newsweek described
the daily standard o f living for the children as “horrific,” because medical and
administrative neglect contributed to a high mortality rate within these institutions.^
Carroll Bogert went on to conclude that for a child, life within these compounds was
comparable to residing in “virtual death camps.”^^ When describing the government’s
one-child policy and family planning, the press leveled charges o f obsessive cruelty and
control at the Communist Party. Their draconian method o f maintaming a stable
population level was said to conflict with the universal rights o f humans in deciding the
fate o f their lives. Further depictions o f the system presented the regime as an entity that
involved itself in the most personal affairs o f citizens. “Controlling the population,” in
Bogert’s view, “is the crucial obsession o f the Chinese authorities... the central core
policy that radiates out in all d i r e c t i o n s . W i t h regard to government interference in
public affairs, Hilary Clinton, at the 1995 women’s conference was quoted as saying:
It is a violation o f human rights when women are denied the right to plan their own
families, and that includes being forced to have abortions or being sterilized against
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their w ill... let m e be clear... freedom means the right o f people to assemble,
organize and debate openly. It means respecting the views o f those who may
disagree with the views o f their governments.^^
An intricate component o f American social philosophy is the belief in individual
self-determination and a respect and love for human diversity. Linked to the idea that
individual development o f cultural characteristics and modes o f behavior should be
guaranteed through representative government, American individualism lends credence
to many ethnic separatist movements around the world. Backed by numerous
entertainment figures from the Hollywood film industry and affiliated NGOs and human
rights groups, the Tibetan independence movement gained a massive following in the
wake o f the Tiananmen crackdown. Presented as the bastion o f ethnic self-determination
in Asia, the Tibetan independence movement was popularized by the press during the
period o f ambivalence.
As the public showpiece o f the Tibetan separatist movement, the Dalai Lama has
taken advantage o f pro-Tibetan sentiments outside o f China. Depicted as the savior o f
ethnic self-determination in the west, the Dalai Lama has become a symbol o f ethno
religious freedom for the American press. Time ran a short article in December o f 1995
in which the Tibetan leader reiterated his unyielding position toward Beijing. “Unless we
guard our own country,” he declared, “it will now happen that the Dalai and Panchen
Lamas, the Father and the Son, and all the revered holders o f the Faith, will disappear and
become nameless.”^* Even though Beijing regarded Tibet as historically a part o f greater
China, American sentiments leaned heavily toward the Tibetan position that the province
was an independent tributary o f China. Other depictions o f Chinese political domination
in the remote province characterized the current policy o f the government as “cultural
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genocide.”*^^ In sum, the combined depiction of Tibetan suppression, the low status o f
women, and the brutal condition o f government orphanages cemented an image o f
communist brutality within the American psyche.
Most notably, the pivotal event that became the catalyst in heightening American
fears o f Chinese expansionism was the PRCs show o f military force near the Taiwanese
coast in mid-1995. The presentation o f this potential political crisis in the American
press followed a pattern o f biased anti-Chinese coverage so common to the period under
scrutiny. Taiwan, politically and economically, has maintained a congenial relationship
with the United States for more than two decades, but Beijing’s interaction with the
Taipei government has not fared so well. As noted before, American observers in media
and government, left with a sense o f political uncertainty after Tiananmen, were
searching for tangible vahdation o f their assertion that China was in the process of
evolving into an aggressive and malevolent power. Observers, realizing that the current
conflict was a continuation o f the historical conflict between the communist and
nationalists, seized upon the 1995 military exercises as credible proof o f China’s regional
political misconduct. Because Taiwan functioned under democratic principles and a freemarket economic system, Americans felt a certain bond of loyalty to the ideals o f
freedom represented by Taiwan. Hence, when Beijing announced its first round of
routine exercises in the strait, American reports presented the scenario more as an act o f
international aggression, than an internal political dispute; the position held even today
bythePRC.^°
Although passive reference was made to the Chinese claim that the island was a
“renegade province,” virtually every article written at this time lauded the economic
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success o f Taiwan and its adherence to western principles o f representative government
and human freedom. A Newsweek article from February o f 1996 summed up the
American perspective succinctly. [China] regards Taiwan,” Tom Post cynically wrote,
“as a miscreant province —a free-market, democratic stepchild as odds with its
Confucian, socialist parent - and its president a crypto-separatist.”^^ The reason offered
by journalists for the tim ing o f these military maneuvers ranged from an outright show o f
force, to an internal political diversion. According to columnist Greg May, domestic
dissenters, not unlike the students that organized the Tiananmen demonstrations, were
becoming more and m ore difficult for mainland authorities to co-opt and control. Thus,
in the tradition o f the Tiananmen crackdown, the PLAN’S show o f force served as an
immediate deterrent against democratic elements in Taiwan and the mainland. At length.
M ay writes:
In fact, while Taiwan keeps its cool, China is the side that looks truly fiightened.
Some observers say Beijing’s nightmare goes far beyond the specter o f Taiwanese
separatism. The real fear, they say, is the steadily rising tide o f democracy-not only
in Taiwan and Hong Kong but on the mainland as well. And at least some o f that
fear is grounded in fact. China’s galloping prosperity is raising people’s aspirations
and expectations. Growing numbers o f Chinese are realizing for the first time that
individual liberties are no less precious than refrigerators and television sets. That’s
one reason the Beijing government has felt compelled to go on waging its war
against public dissent..
As the issue o f anti-democratic suppression filtered into press reports around this time,
naturally, other questions concerning China’s military capabilities moved to the fore o f
foreign policy inquiries and debates.
In the greater scheme o f cross-cultural image periodization, the Taiwan Strait crisis
galvanized American fears o f Chinese expansionism and military intimidation. With a
critical eye focused upon the miUtary and nuclear capabilities o f China, the American
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government, during the second Clinton administration, fabricated the scenario that China
was actively involved in upgrading its nuclear arsenal, as a means o f eventually
challenging America’s military hegemony in East Asia. Previous fears about the nature
o f post-Cold War politics in China, especially the anxiety witnessed in the era o f
uncertainty, matured in a radically negative direction following the Taiwan incident. As
the transitional point that brought an end to the post-Tiananmen period, the Taiwan crisis
intensified domestic anxiety and fostered the myth that China had taken the place o f the
Soviet Union as the geo-political adversary o f the United States. The fi-agility o f the
period’s optimism, sanguine expectations, and hopefulness had been effectively
undermined by the Chinese military’s show o f force toward the Taiwanese government.
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CHAPTER 5

TAINTED IMAGES: ADVERSARIAL CHINA?
The three year period ending the twentieth century witnessed a reemergence o f
hostile American attitudes toward China. Sparked by the threat o f a Chinese invasion of
Taiwan and its concomitant military modernization, American government officials and
media personnel uncritically concluded that a continuation o f Cold War rivalries was
imminent. Accordingly, American viewers o f the situation emphasized the expansion of
Chinese military power in East Asia, and the potentially destabilizing force that such a
development might signify for the Pacific Rim. In addition, these adjustments in
remedying their outdated/antiquated technology were characterized by many Americans
as a program o f dehberate militarization to counter American military hegemony in East
Asia. Allegations o f suspected espionage on the part o f the Chinese government surfaced
during this era, in conjunction with the assumption that China was on the verge o f
upgrading its nuclear arsenal; a plan that ran counter to the international movement for a
steady reduction o f nuclear weaponry in developed countries.
Since the path that China had taken in the 1990s in moving toward a market
economy was viewed with contempt, given that the regime formulated a politicaleconomic structure that incorporated elements o f capitalism and socialism into its design.
Thus, an image o f China as a rising communist giant captured the American psyche.
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America, however, steadfastly maintained that the incorporation o f China into the global
socio-economic milieu was possible and necessary for the future o f the PRC. As such,
engagement with internationalforces and institutions, access to foreign ideas, and the
proliferation o f free-markets through privatization were the tools by which this transition
was to take place. Thus, the ultimate transformation o f American social philosophy into
a “global standard o f philosophical operation” developed simultaneously along with these
cultural images.
In the former portion o f the decade, governmental and popular appeals to American
ideals o f moral, economic, and political conduct, dominated cross-cultural debates
regarding the contemporary political evolution of China. In the latter part o f the decade,
however, the paradigm o f American ideological superiority shifted to a discussion o f the
same under the rubric o f global universality. At least rhetorically, the American ideal o f
liberal-democracy had become the gauge by which developing countries and their
structures o f government were evaluated.

Images and Foreign Policv: Menacing China
In his book entitled The Third World Century. Charles Stewart Goodwin argues that
as civilizations have ascended and descended in political superiority throughout history,
noticeable signs o f transition have marked these phases o f rise and decline. Most
civilizations that are experiencing a process o f perpetual decline, Goodwin maintains,
exhibit tendencies toward the maximization o f human freedom and individual liberty. On
the other hand, civilizations that are increasing in political influence and international
stature, for the most part, maintain relatively authoritarian systems o f government while
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allowing for only minimal to moderate expressions o f individuality and deviations from
accepted social norm s/ Generally speaking, Goodwin’s assertions are applicable to
recent developments in Asia, but more specifically to the sphere o f Chinese economics
and politics. Given that China maintains an authoritarian system o f government, an
increased level o f attention has been given to the possibility that China is becoming the
latest in a series o f international superpowers. Furthermore, Goodwin’s conjecture has
gained notoriety and popularity among the ranks o f American journalists since the anti
communist bias o f many media personnel compels them to accept apocalyptic and often
paranoid suggestions about the future o f Chinese political evolution.
With regard to the upsurge o f nationahsm in contemporary China, scholars such as
Yongnian Zheng point to a number o f contributing factors that have led to the growth o f
patriotic expressions o f behavior in the post-Tiananmen era. The apparent “crisis o f faith
in Marxism and Maoism,” the delegitimization o f popular support for the CCP after
Tiananmen, and the absence o f the Soviet Union from the geo-political scene, are some
o f the more pertinent variables that have contributed to the rebirth o f nationalism in
China.^ A natural intellectual inclination on the part o f many scholars to equate these
socio-political changes with Chinese expansionism has fostered an uncritical
understanding in circles o f government and the popular press that China has taken the
place o f the Soviet Union as America’s international political.adversary. From a more
critical perspective, as Zheng has observed, the Chinese government has remained
“rational” in its reaction to popular outbursts o f nationalism and emotional patriotism.^
Therefore, heightened fears o f nationalism in China derived from a plethora o f internal
political problems. In many ways, the notion that the government sponsored the upsurge
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in domestic nationalism was unfounded. Nevertheless, the press seized the issue o f
outward power projection and hastily assumed that American hegemony and regional
stability in East Asia were effectively threatened by China’s military modernization and
burgeoning domestic production.
With regard to America’s China policy, the most pressing concern that government
analysts encountered in the wake o f the Taiwan debacle was not necessarily military in
nature, but rather strategic. The question was posed: In a global economic system, how
can a nation configure a long-term, strategic program for dealing with a potential enemy?
Although this question will be addressed in a later section, president Clinton echoed the
fears o f many Americans in a statement presented before The Institute For Peace. By
validating the popular notion that China was a security threat in the East Asian region
during his speech, Clinton passively affirmed the image that the PRC behaved in a
belligerent manner toward its neighbors. At length, Clinton stated:
More recently, many Americans have looked to China to see either the world’s next
great capitalist tiger and an enormous motherlode o f economic opportunity for
American and their workers, or the world’s last great communist dragon and next
great threat to fireedom and security. For a long time, it seems to me, we have argued
about China with competing caricatures. Is this a country to be engaged, or isolated?
Is this a country beyond our power to influence, or a country that is ours to gain and
ours to lose? Now we hear that China is a country to be feared. A growing number
o f people say that it is the next threat to our security and our well-being. What about
this argument? Well, those who say it point out, factually, that if China’s economy
continues to grow on its present trajectory, it will be the world’s largest in the next
century. They argue, correctly, that the Chinese government often defines its
interests in ways sharply divergent firom ours. They are concerned, rightly, by
Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan and at others. From this they conclude that China
is, or will be, our enemy."^
As an adequate solution required for the handling o f a potential adversary, Clinton
tacitly advocated a policy o f strategic engagement. Unfortunately for the administration,
allegations of Chinese espionage surfaced immediately after the Taiwan crisis unfolded.
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Numerous government sources cited the fact that over the past decade, China has taken
steps toward mihtary modernization and technological restructuring. A 1997 State
Department Bulletin asserted that “the Chinese mihtary is trying to transform itself from
a land-based power, centered on a vast ground force, to a smaller, mobile, high-tech
military, but has a long way to go.”^ Supported by conservative elements within
American academia, similar research depicted China as a nation that sought the effective
technological transformation o f its land, air, and sea based forces. In essence, these
reports claimed that China was in the process o f upgrading its weapons systems in order
to meet twenty-first century demands o f operation.
The most controversial o f these allegations pointed to the possibility that sensitive
nuclear information had been compromised through a program o f Chinese espionage that
spanned nearly two decades. The most pubhcly debated aspect to this scenario was the
publication o f the Cox Report, drafted by a select committee of the U.S. House o f
Representatives. In the final presentation o f the document, the summationary overview
determined that “the People’s Republic o f C hina... has stolen design information on the
United States’ most advanced thermonuclear weapons.”^ Moreover, the authors o f the
report admitted that the penetration achieved through covert methods resulted in an
extensive breach o f national security, which, to the surprise o f many, was an operation
that “almost certainly continues today.”^ According to intelligence sources documented
by the committee, the stolen information was acquired by the Chinese in an effort to
modernize their intercontinental balhstic missile program.®
Fearing congressional reprisal from both Democrats and Republicans, Clinton
countered the findings o f the report by maintaining that American military security was
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o f the highest caliber, because he had personally increased the counterintelligience budget
o f the Energy Department “by 15-fold since 1995.”^ Therefore, the popular assertion that
national security had been breached via Chinese covert operations emerged as; an
important assumption o f pubhc policy during the period under consideration. Not only
had China become a threat to Taiwanese security as discussed in the latter chaipter, it also
affected the ability o f the United States to maintain an adequate level o f militaary security.
The question that arose in the ranks of government as a result of the Cox R eport focused
on the steps that were needed to ensure that China modernize along a path thatt was
acceptable to the security requirements of the international community. Even in the
midst o f these negative images, the administration foimd hope for the possibility o f stable
relations.
In his detailed reanalysis o f American historiographical conceptions o f th e Soviet
Union during the Cold War, Stephen F. Cohen has observed that for the duration o f the
entire experience, the Untied States interpreted the industrial, military, and eco*nomic
achievements o f the communist block as the “antithesis o f real progress.”^° Thirough the
publication o f his pathbreakmg work entitled Rethinking the Soviet Experience. Cohen
sought to redirect the efforts o f conservative historians in an analytical direction that
critiqued the Soviet experiment on its own terms. In a similar vein, even though strides
toward this end have been achieved in the realm o f Chinese studies, the graduai erosion
o f anti-Maoism in American Chinese studies has not translated into popular poTitics and
the culture at large. The transformation of the Chinese industrial complex in time last two
decades, since it still functions under the supervision o f a communist regime, h.as been
viewed by government and press officials as quasi- or pseudo-progressive. Hemce, as
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allegations o f Chinese espionage flooded the media in the two remaining years o f the
decade, pohcy makers assumed that its secretive, confining political system was the cause
o f current international tensions.
For most o f the pervious decade, oddly enough. Republican and Democratic
administrations clung to the sanguine idea that in opening China up to American liberaldemocratic ideas o f firee trade, press, and association, its incorporation into the
international community could be undertaken on peaceful terms. However, in the period
possible confrontation which began in 1997 as a result o f the Taiwan strait incident, the
nature o f the ideological rhetoric pertaining to Liberal-democracy changed dramatically.
The source o f genuine progress before this time was said to have originated firom the
libertarian tradition o f the United States and the European Enhghtenment. Interestingly
enough, the content o f the socio-philosophical rhetoric in the period following the
Taiwan crisis era was left unaltered, but the standards o f national conduct for
recognizable reform were no longer interpreted as western in origin. Instead, standards
o f acceptable international conduct were regionally reformulated and presented under the
rubric o f globalism. The nature o f the liberalization and reform debate, therefore, shifted
focus to a liberal-democratic system that was acceptable to capitalist nations world-wide.
Rather than culturally bound concepts o f government with limited applicabiUty, the
content o f ideological policy was said to have received international acceptance and
applicability.
Before continuing with the government’s presentation o f this philosophical
reformulation, it is important to attain an adequate understanding o f how the process o f
globalization operates. From a sociological perspective, in recent years, a new sub-
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discipline o f studies related to globalization has been established. In his masterful
inquiry o f various theoretical aspects o f the emerging global environment, German
sociologist Zygmunt Bauman argues that the movement o f capital across the national
borders has created an economic motivation for the increased interaction o f national
capital and c u l t u r e s . T h e new capitaUst, in Bauman’s view, requires open access to
markets on a global basis, so the global network o f cross-cultural interaction and
economics is m ost accurately understood as a process o f released spatial delimitation.
Many global analysts have discounted the importance o f this phenomena, but as a vital
feature o f the global marketplace, localization and particularization o f cultural ideas,
values, and habits o f mind are being replaced (or augmented) by the expansion o f marketdriven values and cultural norms. As Francis Fukuyama has persuasively suggested,
humanity is in the midst o f an international trend that posits liberal-democracy and free
enterprise as the most useful and sought after forms o f political economy.

In place of

the totalitarian systems o f the twentieth century, humanity has determined — through the
trials o f the Cold W ar— that representative government and the individual worth o f the
human being is best served by a political structure founded on western principles o f
freedom and liberty.
Echoes o f this newly formulated perspective marked the thematic tone o f
government policy following the Taiwan incident. Rather than appeals to the infallibility
o f American values, policy makers advocated the cultural-economic intemationahzation
o f China. In their view, the most effective way o f dealing with the possibility o f Chinese
militarization and regional belligerence was by continuing the pohcy o f comprehensive
engagement. Hence, the method o f bilateral interchange advanced by the Clinton
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administration in a 1997 fact sheet on U.S.-China relations was that o f global interaction.
‘Tirst,” the document read, “the United States seeks to fully integrate China into the
global, market-based economic and trading system. China’s participation in the global
economy wiU nurture the process o f economic reform and increase China’s stake in the
stability and prosperity o f East Asia.” '^
As far as human rights were concerned, the administration stated that gradual crosscultural contact with global standards o f ethics had improved the lives o f countless
Chinese minorities, and had placed the trajectory o f national progress on the road to
actual reform. Although the 1997 factsheet on Chinese human rights issues carefully
avoided stating that the magnitude of human rights reforms in China were impressive, it
nevertheless summarized some of the gains that bilateral engagement had created for the
Chinese populace.
With respect to the above findings, the State Department avoided any mention o f
western value judgments. As far as standards o f conduct were concerned, China had
progressed because its antiquated system o f government and cultural traditions had been
exposed to “outside” (global) patterns o f thought. The writers o f the document concluded
that Clinton’s engagement pohcy had improved the fives o f a significant portion o f the
population:
Exposure to the outside world, exchange o f goods, ideas, and people, has brought
increased openness, social mobility and personal liberties, including greater fireedom
o f movement, greater choice of employment, schooling, and housing opportunities,
and improved access to information.., Over time, citizen-to-citizen contacts through
media, internet and travel expose Chinese people to international standards and
values and will continue to loosen rigid, authoritarian structures."*
Finally, government sources augmented the above position o f international cultural
assimilation with an economic determinant. Cultural influences firom the outside world
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were pertinent elements in freeing China from the stagnancy o f communism, but deeper
reform for the nation demanded more than the diffusion o f democratic ideas into the
complex of variables that foster political-economic change. In the Clinton
administration’s view, the integration o f marketization under international standards o f
commercial behavior was a requisite for long-term success. Progress could only take
place if China was economically drawn into the commercial network o f the global
market. By way o f entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), not only would the
requirements o f membership in such an organization propel the Chinese “toward
acceptance o f the rule o f law” *^ and financial accountability, it would also decrease the
prospects o f China becoming an “isolated and unpredictable” *^ adversary.
In sum, pohcy makers, following the Taiwan incident and the pubhcation o f
subsequent reports that perpetuated the atmosphere o f paranoia created by the initial
cross-strait situation, hastily concluded that China was, in fact, involved in a program o f
wholesale mihtary modernization. In digesting these political developments, government
officials looked to the international system o f commerce as the means by which this
supposed military/economic expansionism might be derailed.

Cultural Images o f a New Cold War?
Cross-cultural perceptions o f China during this period evolved along similar lines as
America’s foreign pohcy initiatives. Given that the Soviet Union collapsed in the wake
o f its own internal pohtical and economic contradictions but China had not, joum ahsts
steadily assumed that the Chinese communists had tentatively averted the same fate by
accommodating the commercial market through limited privatization. In the greater
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scope o f national development, China was, nevertheless, under the control o f a brutal
regime that was willing to jeopardize regional stability for nationahstic purposes. In
effect, China materialized as the post-Cold War enemy o f America in East Asia; a nation
with political intentions that diametrically opposed those o f the United States.
Much o f the popular hype that swept the journalistic community around this time
influenced the analytical perspectives o f many figures in the American literary
community. One author who was deeply affected by the adversarial school o f thought in
the latter half o f the decade was journalist/author Richard Bernstein. Bernstein began his
professional career as a joum ahst for Time magazine in 1973, and later went on to
publish three books on topics related to cultural issues. When Bernstein’s latest book
entered the market in 1997, the fears o f American anti-communists and paranoid
journalists were affirmed by the primary thesis o f the text. The author, in a show o f
uncritical analysis based on unfounded hypothetical assertions, predicted that China and
the United States were on a catastrophic course for eventual military conflict. In citing
the decade-long diplomatic tension that characterized bilateral relations and China’s
military modernization, Bernstein concluded that in the long run, this manner of
diplomacy was unstable and hence unmanageable, so a “looming conflict” between the
two powers was virtually inevitable.*^ As the author described the situation in the first
sentence o f the introduction, “The People’s Republic o f China, the world’s most
populous country, and the United States, its most powerful, have become global rivals,
countries whose relations are tense, whose interests conflict, and who face tougher, more
dangerous times ahead.” *® With predictions such as this inciting fear within the
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American community o f journalists, fiirther manifestations o f malevolent images
progressively emerged in press reports that dealt with China.
The most unsettling of the images crafted by the media was the notion that if the
power o f the middle kingdom increases, the United States is more likely to enter into a
conflictual relationship with the PRC. In echoing Bernstein’s conjecture, William
Holstein stated that in the ranks o f government, “[t]he underlying idea has been that as
China’s power inevitably grew, economic and political interaction would be the most
promising way to avoid showdowns or the emergence o f a new cold war.” ’^ The author
went on to add that containment o f this colossal nation was out o f the question, because
its economic influence in the world “is already so profound.”^® Thus, from a strategic
perspective, the growing role o f China in the twenty-first century required intensive
planning, since China appeared as though it was willing to use force as a means of
achieving its political objectives.
The second most controversial dilemma that entered the media coverage o f U.S.China relations was the allegation that China had acquired missile technology from an
American satellite and communications firm. The Senate Intelligence Committee
investigated the charge that Loral Space and Communications Corp. had “improperly”"*
helped the Chinese in upgrading their antiquated missile systems. The company denied
any wrong doing in the matter, but the perception o f the event in the press dovetailed
reports o f espionage that were advanced by the “Cox Report.”
A more general fear that dominated the coverage o f China in the press was the idea
that China was actively pursuing a program o f military modernization aimed at
dislodging American tactical hegemony in the East Asian hemisphere. Renowned China
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scholar David Shambough observed that China, in fact, was involved in bringing its
military capabilities up to twenty-first century technological standards, but this did not
represent a direct attempt on the part o f Beijing to disrupt the balance o f power that
existed in the region/^ In Shambough’s view, the more probable reason for
technological standardization was deterrence; a pohcy ultimately based on defensive
principles o f national security.
In contrast to this more non-cataclysmic conclusion, the press created a dramatically
adversarial picture o f Chinese mihtary restructuring. Newsweek reporter Michael Hirsh
summarized the goals o f the PLA in purely negative terms when he wrote, “Beijing seeks
to modernize its armed forces to project power in the South China Sea in the 21®*
century.”^^ With regard to nuclear capabihties and the structural dimensions o f Beijing’s
mihtary buildup, Douglas Waher, in a 1999 Time article entitled “China’s Arms Race,”
wrote that “the world’s most populous country wants the world’s best mihtary,” because
it plans on upgrading technical capabihties so it can conduct “limited war under high-tech
conditions.”^"* Hence, by portraying the geo-political intentions o f the PRC as blatantly
offensive in nature and a threat to the stability o f East Asia, the press reports molded an
image o f China as a country that was politically and economicaUy defiant, with respect to
“global” norms o f conduct.
Lastly, the most pertinent development that arose in the area o f cross-cultural
relations was the philosophical and rhetorical shift in America’s dialogue regarding
liberal-democracy and the free market. Due to the collapse o f Soviet c o m m u n ism , the
international movement toward economic and cultural globalization increased
substantially. Without an ideological foe such as the Soviet Union to thwart the
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prolifération o f liberal-democratic values on a global scale, the 1990’s have witnessed the
integration o f post-communist nations into the commercial milieu. Within the national
confines o f the United States, the conceptual underpinning o f capitahsm, democracy, and
individual fireedoms evolved along similar lines. During the era o f ambivalence,
American policy makers and joum ahsts argued that democratic concepts o f government
and firee trade were cultural forces that originated in the west; while maintaining
universal applicability. By the end o f the decade, however, a rhetorical shift occurred in
which Americans repeatedly posited the geographic basis o f capitalism and democracy in
more general, global terms. Suddenly, the political roots o f human liberty and selfexpression were not premised around the western tradition. The international
community, instead, became the source o f free thinking and human self-expression. As
the bulk o f this analysis has hitherto contended, the socio-ideological basis for American
reactions to Chinese poUtical developments were founded on political principles cast in
the light o f western liberal-democracy. This ingrained ethic o f response to foreign crises
was effectively transformed into an accepted socio-philosophical system that
encompassed the global community, save those nations that functioned under
authoritarian regimes.
With respect to the diffusion o f American ideals, literary critic Frederic Jameson has
observed a similar phenomenon in the internationalization o f American popular culture.
American film companies, in an effort to seize markets abroad, have targeted Latin
American, European, and Asian consumer markets with American cinematic productions.
For this reason, Jameson contends, indigenous cultural expression has been stifled by the
onslaught o f American films within these nations.^^ In the international political sphere
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the globalization o f democratic values and institutional ideals progressed similarly. Since
the foundation o f the global economic structure functions under premises o f commercial
exchange that evolved in the western political-economic setting, the recent intensification
o f international commerce has cast the dialogue o f poUtical-economic reform under the
rubric o f global expectations and ideals. The depiction o f China in the late 1990s echoed
this unprecedented alteration in the international arena. In fact, the most interesting
development at this time was that journalists withdrew most references to American
ideahsm fi'om their reports. Apparently, emotional appeals to the core beliefs o f the
western tradition were no longer necessary in securing the primacy o f liberal-democratic
values.
The validation required in indicting China for military expansionism and political
malevolence came with the flurry o f support that Aonericans offered Taiwan during the
cross strait conflict. Rather than isolating China firom the global community, American
pohcy makers and journalists advocated a long-term strategic solution to the rising power
o f the PRC. President Clinton presented this plan as an intricate variable within the
overall plan o f comprehensive engagement. In a 1998 special report printed in
Newsweek magazine, Clinton summarized the nature o f his policy. By applying the new
mode o f pohtical discourse and standardization to his program, Clinton called for an
intensification o f engagement on all possible fironts:
In short, America has an interest in a stable, secure and open China that embraces
political pluralism, firee markets and the rule o f law and joins us in working to build a
secure international order. Working with China serves our interest in open trade.
Access to its markets remains far too restricted. We could retaliate... [o]r we can
keep pressing China to open its markets and to join the World Trade Organization on
commercially meaningful term s... The more we bring China into the world, the more
the world brings fireedom to China.^^
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National integration into the global matrix is a multifaceted process, however.
President Clinton packaged a wide variety o f issues into the above comment, but the most
crucial aspect o f this globahzation process was the commercial economy. In advancing a
more prosperous and open China, the popular press affirmed the vahdity o f the idea that
the international marketplace was the tool by which closed societies were to become
actors in a new economic structure that embraced all willing participants. Mortimer
Zuckerman captured this commercial axiom marvelously when stating, “for survival [in
the global milieu],” the author declared, “China must integrate with the world economy
— and therefore shrink the role o f the state.”^^ In order to achieve such an outcome in
the political-economy o f the nation, Newsweek writer Michael Hirsh pointed to China’s
possible entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a means o f securing a
peaceful coexistence with its trading partners. If foreign companies further their financial
stake in the Chinese domestic market, so the argument went, the central government
would be forced to accept international standards o f trade and market exchange.^® The
basic logic o f the argument is that as non-national influence penetrates the conservatism
o f dogmatic socialism and hence the state, this process will coax the nation’s leaders into
fully converting state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) and semi-socialized firms into privately
owned and operated entities. Moreover, the use o f the WTO as a mechanism for bringing
about this sanguine outcome was posited by Hirsh as the next major hurdle in U.S.-China
relations.
In a philosophical sense, America’s underlying assumptions about reform and social
change in contemporary China had come full circle. Within popular discourse,
notwithstanding the cross-cultural antagonism that typified the three concluding years of
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the decade, the idea prevailed that the inclusion of China into the global nettwork o f
cultural dialogue, trade, and communication was imperative, if its entry in to the global
community was to occur on peaceful terms. Moreover, the habitual appeal o f
government officials and journalists to western idealism as the driving fo rce o f cultural
transformation waned during this period, because as British sociologist Mamfin Albrow
has observed, global perspectives on cultural development and political evolution have
replaced regional, localized, and national forms o f social discourse.^^ Therefore, the past
decade has witnessed a progressive rise in American hesitancy about C hina, and later the
increased cross-cultural disdain for a political-economic system that govemoment analysts
and joum ahsts viewed as possibly threatening the supremacy o f American m ilitary power
in East Asia.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION, AND THE CREATION
OF HISTORICAL FICTION
The chronological format o f this project has centered around the primary thesis that
as Sino-American relations have progressed in the past decade, American cultural
misperceptions and popular judgments o f Chinese social, pohtical, and economic
developments resulted in the formulation o f a fictional history o f contemporary China.
The existence o f a strong ideological inclination toward interpreting foreign cultures via
domestic standards o f evolutionary progression was illustrated as the primary cause o f
these inaccurate and often uncritical ethnocentric conclusion. Beginning in the preTiananmen period, popular images o f China concentrated on the reformist nature o f the
Deng regime while de-emphasizing the pohtical constraints that were characteristic o f
Chinese pohtical culture in this era.
After the Tiananmen Square massacre, however, the American government began to
focus intensively on the highly negative and unpredictable nature o f the regime in China.
In addition, the possibihty that China in the coming years could very well become an
aggressive economic and military giant in the region, was also another factor that moved
to the forefront o f the pohcy debate. Even though the economic stance o f the United
States remained much the same after the incident, emphasis was increasingly placed on
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non-proliferation, the nature o f the communist regime, human rights, Chinese
expansionism, and relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan. Because the images that the
press produced were so volatile and culturally biased, the first chapter o f a fictional
history regarding the socio-political evolution o f China was created in the media.
Because American institutions such as the government and the press have a unique
missionary nature, in terms o f propagating American ideals abroad, the returned images
about the socio-pohtical climate in China were tainted with an ethnocentric negativity.
Policy makers and the media refused to look past the blood that had been spilled in
Beijing to ascertain the true nature o f the incident, therefore, a skewed impression o f
these two tumultuous months was presented to the public, with only minimal information
about the deeper political, social, and cultural elements o f the Tiananmen fiasco.
In the wake o f the Tiananmen debacle, America’s optimism dwindled quickly and
popular-political images o f China swung dramatically in the opposite direction, to create
an atmosphere in which modifications in Beijing’s reform policies and economic
advancements were viewed in a duahstic/ambivalent manner. When Chinese leaders
decided to undertake mihtary exercises in the Taiwan Strait in m id-1995, America’s
perceptions o f the PRC swung even further in a distinctly negative direction; an event
that marked the outset o f a three-year period during which Chinese military
modernization was seen as a direct threat to America’s military preeminence in East Asia.
In the greater scheme o f cross-cultural image periodization, the Taiwan Strait crisis
galvanized American fears o f Chinese expansionism and military intimidation. With a
critical eye focused upon the m ihtary and nuclear capabilities o f China, the American
government, during the second Clinton a d m in is tr a tio n , fabricated the scenario that China
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was actively involved in upgrading its nuclear arsenal, as a means o f eventually
challenging America’s military hegemony in East Asia. Previous fears about the nature
o f post-Cold War politics in China, especially the anxiety witnessed in the era o f
uncertainty, matured in a radically negative direction following the Taiwan incident. As
the transitional point that brought an end to the post-Tiananmen period, the Taiwan crisis
intensified domestic anxiety and fostered the myth that China had taken the place o f the
Soviet Union as the geo-political adversary o f the United States. Although images and
literary descriptions o f China cast a unsavory light over Beijing’s long-term intentions in
Asia, American expectations o f Chinese political-economic restructuring remained fairly
optimistic. However, the socio-philosophical rhetoric of this period downplayed the
notion that China needed to accept western ideals and standards o f political evolution.
Rather, the liberal-democratic assumptions through which American correspondents and
government officials interpreted developments in China were reformulated to meet the
needs o f an international economic order that fimctioned under common principles o f
individual fi-eedom, representative government, and firee enterprise.
This feature o f America’s cross-cultural depiction o f China was arguably the most
pertinent ideological modification o f the post-Cold War period. Throughout the Cold
War and during the decade that followed the collapse o f Soviet communism, the sociophilosophical core o f American liberal-democracy was conceptually tied to its indigenous
roots within the libertarian tradition o f the United States and the European
Enhghtenment. Different facets o f this tradition carried various levels o f ideological
weight at specific junctures in Sino-American relations, but ultimately, the cultural
supremacy o f western democratic thinking was reaffirmed in virtually all cases. In the
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1990s, as a result o f the political-economic transformations that were undertaken by post
communist nations, the capitalist (free-market) ethos gained additional acceptance in
Eastern Europe and East Asia. Communism, as a viable alternative to the social
problems created by the free-market, was no longer lauded by left-wing theorists,
populists, and national socialists as a credible structure o f government that could
eradicate the social ills o f capitalism. As such, the free-market ethic, procedural
democracy, consumerism, and individualism, attained a preeminent status in the
international political sphere. Since the marketplace o f ideas functioned under the
premises o f liberal-democracy as the underlying force o f commercial innovation, the
philosophy acquired a global character. W ithin the new global structure o f markets,
liberal-democracy was said to have received unanimous acceptance by the nations whose
economic maturation had been stifled under socialism. In many ways, as Francis
Fukuyama suggested, the triumph o f democracy has ushered in a new epoch in human
history where a nation’s success depends on its adaptability to the modem condition. It
remains to be seen, however, if the fruits o f a burgeoning market can remedy the
countless social ills (poverty, unemployment, and social dislocation) that are endemic to
laissez-faire capitalism and procedural democracy.
In sum, when these transitions in attitude are viewed as part o f a greater historical
picture, popular depictions o f China in the past decade have contributed to the legacy o f
existing Cold War stereotypes regarding communist and post-communist nations. The
methods o f reform, the intentions o f student demonstrators and the relations o f the
conservative elite, the culture of Chinese free enterprise, and the objectives o f military
modernization are but a few o f the questions that Americans have answered through a
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contemptuous lens o f anti-socialist disdain and statist economic intervention. As a result,
academic conclusions regarding the political nature o f contemporary China have rarely
corresponded with the less objective conclusions propagated by their counterparts in the
profession o f journalism.
Finally, i f globalization has brought about the internationalization o f cultural norms
and political ideals as this study has suggested, the mode o f analysis apphed in this
examination w ill require subtle reconfiguration for future case studies o f this sort. The
notion o f an ideological superstructure as the basis for the perpetuation and transmition o f
culture is a feasible point o f departure for cross-national inquiry between nation-states,
but when the boundaries that maintain the integrity o f socio-philosophical norms within
the confines o f a particular nation-state are cast aside or progressively deconstructed,
Chomsky’s firamework o f a cultural superstructure is insufficient in explaining the
nuances that are fostered by the cross-assimilation o f values. For example, how might
the social analyst examine the proliferation o f democratic ideals, individuahsm, and
consumerism, i f the geographic source o f these principles is no longer analytically
tangible? How does a student o f cultural transmition locate the domestic reaction to
heterogeneous forms o f thought when the demarcation o f international political and
ethical differences is gradually fading. These and other vital issues, in the coming
decade, will compel the academic community to engage the modifications that
globalization has generated within the spatial dynamics o f cross-cultural studies. As
such, the fluidity o f modernity has destroyed the cultural isolationism o f the twentiethcentury and replaced it with the global epoch o f commercial internationalism.
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